Terrorist Activities are not just a menace to the American nation, but also to the rest of the world, including the areas that terrorist training goes on in the Arab world. Terrorist associations are faced with various situations and challenges such as the increase in anti-terrorist security, which compels them to dynamically change their structures, for purposes of coordinating their activities and communication. Therefore, there are instances when terrorist groups use of the hierarchy mode of operations whereby instructions are dispatched from a central headquarters, and there is a time when terrorist associations employ the leaderless model of operations, which is social based and takes advantage of technology such as the use of social networks.
Marc Sageman who was born in Europe and educated in America, has a doctorate in political psychology and is a practicing psychiatrist (Hoffman, 2008b). In addition, he was a flight surgeon in the American Navy after which he joined the Criminal Intelligence Agency in 1984. Later he worked closely with the Mujahedeen forces in Afghan, in a fight against the Soviets (Hoffman, 2008b). Therefore, Sageman has vast knowledge and experience on terrorist organizations and their operations. Sageman recommends that the most effective way of dealing with terrorism is to understand the web of relationships among the members and sympathizers since they are based on a structure that is leaderless (Picarelli, 2008). Arndt (2010) suggests that terrorist organizations are flexible in their operations for instance, the change of Al-Qaeda’s structure for hierarchical to decentralized and the change in location of operation, are some of the factors that have helped it to survive. Leaderless jihad is the biggest threat that America faces from loose cells of Muslim immigrants or Western born Muslims who work/study in the West (Hoffman, 2008b). Sageman uses the Bottom-Up model to explain terrorist operations whereby the Al-Qaida terrorist group unlike in the past, has changed into a more independent, diffused, and domestic group as compared to 2001 (Goldstein, 2008). The Western-Born Muslim’s or Muslim-Immigrants pose a potential terrorist threat to Western countries (Hoffman, 2008a). These ordinary people are interacted with on a daily basis. Sageman contends that Al-Qaeda changed its way of operations from the format whereby the leaders do all the planning and give all the instructions, to local based groups of individuals who have the terrorist leaders as their mentors (Hoffman, 2008a).. These local terrorist groups are the ones that are a threat to Western countries (Hoffman, 2008a).
On the other hand, Bruce Hoffman is a professor of Security Studies and he believes that terrorist groups have a central headquarters, which is an important, part the global terrorist network. In order to defeat Al-Qaeda, the network needs an empirical analysis as opposed to fact-less theories and methodologies. America and its allies should focus more on the areas where the terrorist group re-organizes itself. A terrorist group cannot be crushed by military approach solely; a strategy that weakens and destroys the group should be employed. Hoffman suggests the continued capture or extermination of the terrorist group leaders, and the interruption of the recruitment cycle as the only way of defeating terrorist groups (Goldstein, 2008). Hoffman uses the Top-Down model to explain terrorist operations whereby a hierarchy exists, and the top officials carry out the terrorist activity plans and they coordinate the education, financing, as well as the attacks.
Hoffman criticizes comments made by Sageman in the book, Understanding Terrorist Networks, whereby Sageman states that Al-Qaeda is not an organization but a social network that needs to be disrupted. Hoffman states that Sageman used non-factual basis to argue his Leaderless-Theory of a terrorist organization, since he misinterpreted historical events such as the claim that the trigger of World War I was as the result the anarchist operations of the Irish Republican Army (Hoffman, 2008a). Hoffman also adds that Sageman’s theory of terrorism, as a social network does not have scientific backing (Hoffman, 2008a). Hoffman claims that scientific methods and tools were not used in the research carried out by Sageman, in addition to lack of quotes from the works of renowned experts in the field of terrorist social networks (Hoffman, 2008a). Sageman also made many assumptions such as the assumption that media is the best source for terrorist research information and the dismissal of academic publications with the claim that the academic experts are specialists in other fields, hence they do not follow literature on terrorism keenly and that the academic experts choose facts selectively (Hoffman, 2008a). Sageman favors the individual perspective of explaining terrorism because he is a trained psychiatrist, rather than concentrating on the collective or structural model (Hoffman, 2008a).
Sageman responded to Hoffman’s article by claiming that Hoffman miss-understood his message. Sageman claims that Al-Qaeda’s operations have been changing frequently which has resulted to the current structure, which is social network based and is composed of independent groups (Sageman, 2008). Sageman emphasizes that his book, Leaderless Jihad explains the four-staged process of radicalization, the difference between terrorism in America and Britain and how aspiring terrorists use the internet as a communication tool, an aspect which he claims to have been ignored when doing analysis of the recent terrorist operations (Sageman, 2008). These individuals pose a major threat to Western countries’ security. Sageman adds that his source of evidence is trial transcripts from United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain just to mention a few, and Sageman also consulted with various law enforcement agencies(Sageman, 2008 ). Marc Sageman counter’s Hoffman’s views by stating that Hoffman’s point of view neglects the fact that terrorist groups transform over time. Sageman suggests that terrorist groups currently use a means of interconnected communication such as the internet and social media, and they are composed of several independent groups (Arndt, 2011). Sageman adds that this is a new development in terrorism that is currently overlooked when analyzing terrorist threats (Goldstein, 2008). The threats of a terrorist group are still significant, and they increase incase vigilance is not maintained (Sageman & Hoffman, 2008). Sageman (2008) states that al-Qaeda’s main cause is still alive and that the surviving leaders, still plan on the various ways of causing harm. Terrorist activities are inhibited by increased global security measures, hence efforts to eliminate and capture the terrorist leaders should be pursued (Sageman & Hoffman, 2008).
On July 2007, National Intelligence Estimate and yearly threat assessment presented by Mike McConnell who was the Director of national intelligence, stated that Al-Qaeda was the top most threat to homeland security, because the central leadership consistently coordinated planned attacks, and they influence other extremist groups to mimic Al-Qaeda’s operations (Hoffman, 2008a). Hoffman adds that the terrorist groups are very flexible and they can practice both Top-Down and Bottom-Up methods of operation (Hoffman, 2008a). Mike McConnell also stated that Al-Qaeda and other affiliates posed the greatest danger to American security especially the central leadership based at the border of Pakistan (Hoffman, 2008a). Although the terrorist group lost most of its operatives over the years, the terrorist group has been able to make their replacements hastily (Hoffman, 2008a). McConnell also added some members were sent to establish cells in other countries such as Iraq. On November 2006, Eliza Manningham-Buller, who was the Director General of the British Security Service, reported that her organization had knowledge of several plots to kill several people and to damage the British economy (Hoffman, 2008a). The plots were linked to the Al-Qaeda’s headquarters in Pakistan (Hoffman, 2008a).
While both Hoffman and Sageman’s view are credible about the operations and structures of terrorist associations, terrorist groups are flexible and they alter their formations depending on the situation facing them. For instance after the elimination of the terrorist leaders, the group is left leaderless, therefore it operates as a social frame work, as pointed out by Sageman, until the existing members and sympathizers regroup themselves and reconstruct the group’s hierarchy. Also according to Hoffman’s perspective, the Top-Down structure is very important for terrorist groups, since the Top-Bottom structure is the most efficient means for them to coordinate the source of funds, recruiting, training, and the execution of terrorist activities. Hence, terrorist groups are have existing structures which they can use to reconstruct themselves, and the social relations between the group members bonds them even after the structure is disrupted. Therefore, it is important to constantly arrest all the parties who are involved in the various activities of terrorism from the headquarters to the domestic individuals and groups. There is also a need for constant surveillance of terrorist group activities to establish their recent mode of operations and to take proactive measures against them.
References
Arndt, M.C. (2011). “Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century”. Air & Space Power Journal. Academic Onefile.
Goldstein, E. R. (2008). “The Nature of the Terrorism Threat: Critical Mass”. Chronicle of Higher Education. Ebscohost.
Hoffman, B. (2008a). “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism”. University of Pennsylvania Press. Ebscohost
Hoffman, B. (2008b). “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism”. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on 15 Dec 2012 from: < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63408/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-terrorism>
Picarelli J.T. (2008). “The Future of Terrorism”. NIJ Journal. Retrieved on16 Dec 2012 from: < https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/228387.pdf >
Sageman, M & Hoffman, B. (2008). “Does Osama Still Call the Shots: Debating the Containment of al Qaeda’s Leadership”. Retrieved on 15 Dec 2012 from < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots>
Winer, C. (2010). “Smoke 'em out: U.S. counterterrorist mishaps necessitating the expansion of INTERPOL's capabilities to meet the new terrorist threat”. Suffolk Transnational Law Review. Academic Onefile.
