Introduction
This argument is specifically based on the negative variations and beliefs that arise from the Sorites arguments of the Eubulides (Unger118). The argument greatly relates to the Greek who came up with the paradox of a lie. Moreover, the Greek greatly presented arguments on the motive of intentionality and presupposition. From these great ideas, the Greek became incomparable to any other philosopher in the field, indeed, he was second to none. The ideas he presented were deeply rooted to some element of truth. Philosophy is a field that requires wide knowledge and factual reasoning, as a result, philosophers read widely to acquaint there knowledge with some of the strongest arguments. This arguments is majorly based on the number of items that can constitute a heap. The question as to how many items can constitute a heap is a topic that attracts diverse opinions. This arguments will strive to unearth some of the contentious issues underlying the number of items that constitute a heap in let’s say sand, beans or just grains in generality.
Section 1. Discussion of the Sorites Argument of Eubulides
The major topic under discussion on the sorites arguments of the eubilides is nothing much but the number of items that can constitute a heap. As in the ordinary case, taking for example the case of beans, it is clear that no beans or just one bean is sufficient. Now the question is, how many seeds of beans can be sufficient. It is a debatable issue which requires critical thinking. In a nutshell, adding no bean or just adding one cannot give rise to a heap of beans (Unger 117). There is a group idea behind a heap of beans, as it is previously agreed, neither one bean nor none will form a heap. There must be several beans for it to qualify as a heap. When simply put, even if an individual has over a million beans but he decides to arrange them nicely perhaps in rows and columns, still there will be no heap. The concept of heaps is relatively incoherent, for one to qualify beans to be a heap, then they must be grouped together, otherwise, people will still to say that there is no heap.
The concept of arranging over a million beans in rows and columns only gives a gleam blueprint of the concept of generalization (Unger 118). But to turn things upside down, assuming the one million beans were put together such that they qualify to be called a heap, removing one bean from the heap will not disqualify it from being called a heap. Yet again, the ambiguity of how many pieces of beans qualify to be called a heap presents itself. Moreover, a bean, two, five, or ten beans still not qualify to be a heap, even when put together. The sorites arguments of the eubilides further makes an astonishing conclusion, that even if one bean or none is left before us, then we still have a heap of beans. Quite astonishing and absurd, in fact, the argument leaves us more perplexed. How can we have a heap of beans with only one or no bean? In such a scenario, we need to generalize accordingly, this takes us back to the original supposition and further to the concept of existence.
Section 2. Novel Objection of the Sorites Argument of Eubulides.
This form an argument is an indirect argument, therefore, we must get back to the concept of originality and existence, it’s not appropriate to conclude that one bean or none at all is still a heap. As a matter of fact, we must utilize the concept of coherent view and conclude that there is no heap in such a case. The argument is basically basing its facts on the sorites arguments, however much it might seem logical, it is not based on truths. The Eubilides contribution is just but only labored on sorites paradox (Unger119). Furthermore, the argument presents more paradox to the readers, this should not be the case. Moreover, the paradox does not qualify to be a real paradox but only gives two demonstration on the non-existence of heaps. From the two demonstrations on the non-existence of heaps, it’s agreeable to make such a conclusion since there would be no logical problems arising from the conclusion.
The objection is a good one since avoiding the concept of identity leads to further confusion and perhaps makes the understanding of the Eubulidean more difficult. However, using the least materials will imply that the existence of ordinary things is something that is debatable, consequently they can be disapproved. In conclusion, existence is something that is quite hard to debate on, it should be taken just the way things are in reality.
Work Cited
Unger, Peter. There Are No Ordinary Things. Synthese, Vol 41, No. 2. Boston, United States of
America: Springer Publishers, 1979.
