Throughout the course of modern history, numerous events have revolved around the Middle East, affecting the cultural perspectives of the people living there. For instance, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent political maneuvering by Western/Arab nations spawned decades of bloodshed in the region, destroying both an entire generation of people and the viability of a nation. The creation of Israel in 1948 created a massive power shift in the region, as the Arab nations attempted to retake the territory but were soundly defeated, and again in 1967. The Second World War engulfed the North African Muslim countries, and their attempted colonization by the Axis powers spawned contempt for colonial powers. As historians go back, they often point to the Sykes-Picot Agreement as the root cause of Arab nationalism, and the reason it is so prevalent today. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was spawned as a result of the First World War, as the world endured a war which it had never seen before. The British and French, allied in their attempts to defeat the German-speaking empires, sought to use Arab nationalism to overthrow the Ottoman Empire, which fought on the side of the Central Powers. However, the cause of Arab nationalism can also be traced back a few years to the promises delivered to Sharif Hussein. The Sykes-Picot Agreement betrayed this, and it had direct implications on the future of the region; namely, the slow reshaping of national/cultural identities would impede the creation of Israel after World War II. This paper aims to argue that the Sykes-Picot Agreement had a strong influence on the politics of the region for decades to come, and provide evidence for how it led to the current tensions felt in the region today.
The Sykes-Picot Agreement came as a result of the First World War. The Ottoman Empire, though on its last leg, was still a staunch ally of the Central Europeans, as it used the opportunity of war to strike against its traditional adversary, the Russian Empire. The French and British assaulted the Ottomans, but could not bring down the Empire directly, due to their commitment to the Western front. During the negotiations, the Gallipoli campaign was still raging on, which would result in the near massacre of the Allied troops. The Agreement was a secret treaty, in which the British claimed Mesopotamia all the way to the Persian Gulf after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). The French claimed Syria and Anatolia, and the Russians claimed Armenia. Palestine was meant to be ruled by an international force, as the area contained numerous holy sites. The Sykes-Picot Agreement went against the promises made to the Emir Hussein, ruler of the Hejaz region and also ruler of Mecca and Medina. Known as the Grand Sharif, Hussein was widely respected in the Arab world as a result of his position, and was well known for his dislike of the Ottomans who controlled the area (Enterprises, n.d.). At the outbreak of the Great War, the British reached out to Hussein in order to flirt with the idea of establishing an Arab nation with British support, provided Hussein lead the revolt. Hussein agreed.
The Arab revolt was launched seventh months after the Sykes-Picot Agreement was negotiated and agreed upon. The idea of Arab nationalism was already instilled in the Middle East, as the concept of an Arab state stretched from Syria in the north to Yemen in the south. The only factor in the way was the oppressive Ottomans. The Arabs received support from the British in the form of T.E. Lawrence, romantically referred to as Lawrence of Arabia. Lawrence was an army captain known for his understanding and respect for Arab culture, and he formed a friendship with Hussein and his family that would last until they all passed away. Lawrence directly contributed to Arab nationalism by protecting the Arabs interests against the British. On several occasions, Lawrence recognized a British political trap and maneuvered the Arabs to avoid it, as the French and British sought to take Aqaba to surround the Arabs (Anderson, n.d.). Lawrence led the Arabs to capture the city first in defiance of the British trap planned.
Thus, Lawrence of Arabia committed an act of sedition, but it was not his first. He informed the Sharif’s son Faisal of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, likely due to guilt (Anderson, n.d.). This guilt had been building as Lawrence recruited Arab tribe after tribe to the cause of Arab nationalism, as he sought to increase the numbers of the Arab Revolt. Thus, if the Sykes-Picot Agreement is the catalyst for Arab nationalistic tensions, the massive success of Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, along with the promises the Allies broke to the Arabs, was the fuel that fanned the flames.
After the fall of the Russian Empire to communism, the communist Kremlin released the secret treaties which bound the Russian Empire, causing significant anger in the Arab world. The Arabs were furious they had been manipulated, and the most fertile and productive lands that were an Arab majority would be separated from the Arab Kingdom. Essentially, Hussein was promised the great desert that is Saudi Arabia, though the oil wealth of the region was not known. Hussein lost even this, as his seat was taken by another local invader who took the crown of Saudi Arabia for himself.
Not only was it bad enough that the Agreement broke promises made to the Arabs, but it also created countries and regions based on nothing other than lines drawn with a ruler on a map (Osman, 2013). The territories divided into Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait ignored all sectarian and ethnic divisions. It failed to take into account the numerous ethnic groups living throughout the regions: the diaspora of Jews, Turks, Kurds, and other groups. Sunni and Shia lines were also ignored, and individual tribes had no authority or power. This would later result into minority groups ruling over a majority radically different from the ruling party. Some historians have argued that this was necessary for the peace in the region, as sectarian violence would emerge as a result of a majority rules nation-state. However, the prevailing argument in later times would be that a large nation composed of all the Arab peoples would maintain peace as all citizens would be a part of something far greater than a local nationalistic movement. Regardless of whether or not history contradicts this viewpoint, the division of the Middle East into lines based around Sykes-Picot would spawn nations composed of rulers who would see to maintain power no matter the cost, as any game theorist could tell you. This is because it is clearly in their self-interest. Thus, Sykes-Picot can be traced to have led directly to the brutality of local rulers in the modern day, including Saddam Hussein.
This is because the Sykes-Picot Agreement generated Arab nationalism that created some of the most dangerous political movements in the region’s turbulent history, from Nasserism in Egypt to Baathism in Iraq (Wright, Anderson, Filkins, & Muhanna, 2016). These parties believe in uniting the Arab people as their fundamental tenet, and are willing to achieve any means necessary to do so. Indeed, the idea of Arab nationalism would contribute substantially to the many terrorism threats that would plague the world in the modern era, as most of the most powerful Islamic radical groups seek to return to an Islamic caliphate.
The Sykes-Picot agreement created two very different strains of nationalism in the Arab states which were created from the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. France and Great Britain through the league of nations created two distinct spheres of influence in the Middle East The British in their sphere of influence created 3 separate states. This included Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq). In these two majority Arab states the British installed Hashemite rulers to the newly created Kingdoms in Transjordan and Iraq. Faisal and Abdullah were the sons of Husain the Sharif of Mecca and Medina. For one to better understand the meaning of the Sykes-Picot agreement and what it meant for the creation of a new Middle East shaped primarily by the powers of nationalism; it is important to explain the Hashemite legacy and the importance of British imperialism in the Middle East in the years after the First World War.
The Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I was just the beginning of a new wave of nationalism and especially Arab nationalism that would sweep the Middle East through the better part of the rest of the twentieth century. Britain fomented the revolt against the Ottomans as way of attempting to create a new front in the Middle East. In order to accomplish this the British government decided that it was of the utmost importance to engage the Arabs in the war effort. As a matter fact, Sykes told the Cabinet that the Arabs and the Arab cause “were now of prime importance to the allies; and it was urgently important to reach agreement with Hussein.” (Fromkin, 2009, p.182) The British put very high priority of securing the participation of the Arabs in a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Through a series of correspondence between Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt and Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca and Medina they were able to reach an agreement for securing Arab participation in the war against the Central Powers more specifically the Ottomans. The Sharif’s ancestry also played a significant part of why the British chose him as their partner.
Britain’s contact with Hussein the Sharif of Mecca, effectively the Ottoman governor of the Hejaz was highly connected to his heritage and the possible legitimacy and prestige that it would bring to the possible revolt. Hussein ancestry made him a very powerful and respected figure among Arabs and Muslims, because he was a Sharif, “one of a rather large class of individuals claiming descent from the Muhammad through the Prophet’s daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali.” (Paris, 2004, p.7) Hussein was also able to trace his lineage to Hashim, the “great-grandfather of Muhammad” as well as being a member of the same tribe as the Prophet, a Quraysh. (Paris, 2004, p.7) While this did not of itself give Hussein temporal, military or political power it gave him and whatever cause he was in support of something even more important, legitimacy. Throughout 1915 and 1916 the British government stayed in close contact with Hussein and made assurances that they would create a large Arab state from the former Ottoman provinces in the Middle East. In a series of letters between Sharif Hussein and McMahon they attempted to craft a plan for the creation of an Arab Kingdom that would be ruled by Hussein in return for Arab involvement in the war against the Ottomans. While it is not appropriate or indeed possible to explain every detail of the correspondence between Hussein and McMahon it is still important to explain the impact of this communication for the future of Anglo-Arab relations in the years after World War I.
The significance of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence during World War I was that it was a tacit acceptance by the British government of the legitimacy of Arab and most importantly Sharifian or Hashemite claims to the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. McMahon in a letter to Hussein outlined five points in which the British agreed to accept these terms outlined below. King Hussein requested to the British after the war the independence of a piece of territory which would be
bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37th degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. (Hussein-McMahon Correspondence no.1)
The Sharif in this letter also granted to England, “preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.” As well as requesting that Britain “approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.” (Hussein-McMahon No.1) This created the geographical structure of the Middle East for the rest of the twentieth century and to the modern day. The British government through McMahon agreed to these points and most importantly were ready to “give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.” (Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, No. 4) The Hussein-McMahon correspondence and its impact on the future of the Middle East was just one feature of what is an inescapable part of statecraft and power politics which Britain engaged in a large part of its history and was a feature of its mode of Imperial expansionism. The promises made to Sharif Hussein in 1915 and 1916 were integral to assuring Arab participation in the revolt against the Ottomans. The Sykes-Picot agreement would effectively dismantle the framework crafted through the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and instead created a new form of European imperial control in the Middle East.
The realities of the Sykes-Picot agreement destroyed the great Arab hope for a single united Arab state ruled by a Hashemite king. The model proposed in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence was instead replaced by an entirely new mechanism which reaffirmed British and French preeminence in the region as was outlined in the Sykes-Picot agreement. The terms of Sykes-Picot and the important territorial and political implications of it were enshrined by the creation of a new model of control. France and Britain were able to assert their authority in the Middle East by using the League of Nations and its newly minted system of Mandates. In the years after World War I, Hussein’ sons Faisal an Abdullah were with time given the power to be the rulers of the British Mandates of Transjordan and Iraq. Faisal was made King of Iraq after being expelled from Syria and Abdulla with time came to be the Emir of Transjordan. (Simon, 1974) Faisal and Abdullah were Hashemites and they were the sons of Hussein but there was very little support for their rule. In Iraq, the British claimed that 96 percent of the population accepted Faisal while the reality was much more complicated. The British disregarded much of the opposition and “were reluctant to reveal that this referendum showed that there were some Euphrates liwas that requested continued British control; that the Kurds of Sulaimaniya abstained from the voting; and that Kirkuk rejected the Amir completely.” (Simon, 1974, p.316) The brothers were ultimately not satisfied with their thrones and had designs on creating a united Hashemite kingdom which included Syria but this ultimately didn’t come to fruition. The British Hashemite order in Iraq and Transjordan was solidified by the Treaty of Lausanne.
The priorities put forward by Hussein in 1915 and 1916 were subverted by the harsh realities of statecraft and the seemingly unstoppable impetus of British imperialism which became of utmost importance in the period after World War I. These concerns led to the creation in 1920 at the San Remo conference of a new model of rule which would mean the ultimate defeat of the Hashemite mode of Arab nationalism. The mandate system created at San Remo ceded control of former Ottoman Territory to Britain and France which would administer these new states. Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan were British mandates while Syria and Lebanon where French ruled (Hunt, 2006). The geopolitical impact of these Mandates where most significant as a way assuring British control in the Middle East, the mandate system might have thwarted the Hashemite dream of a Pan-Arab unity under a Caliphate but it did assure the British the “longest interval of secure pre-eminence in the Middle East during the whole period of their regional imperium from 1918 to 1956.” (Darwin, 199, p.166) The assertion of British imperial power in the Middle East after World War I through the creation of League of Nations mandates was just one way in which this frustrated the political plans of Muslims and Arab Nationalists. Britain’s acceptance of Zionism and its acceptance for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was a thorn on the side of Arab Nationalists.
The promises made to the Sharif by McMahon and the British government as a method of assuring their participation in the Arab Revolt meant assurances that would mean the creation of an independent Arab state in the former Ottoman empire. This was subverted by Sykes-Picot and enshrined as international law through the creation of the League of Nations mandates. The mandates created separate Arab states and thwarted the idea of Hashemite or Arab unity. Another way in which Britain was able to curtail pan-Arab goals was by their tacit acceptance of the Zionist cause. Lord Balfour who was British Foreign Secretary in 1917, wrote a letter to Walter Rothschild that gave Britain’s assent for the creation of a “national home’ for the Jewish people in Palestine. Balfour’s letter read:
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." (Balfour, 1917)
This was by in large an acceptance by the British government of the validity of Zionist claims for Palestine and that it would work to create a mechanism for the creation of a Jewish national home in it. Herbert Samuel an important Jewish liberal said that although a future British mandate in Palestine would be based on the Balfour declaration, he insisted that no Arabs would be “despoiled of their land or required to leave the country.” As well as assurances that the Jewish minority wouldn’t rule the Arab majority as well the protection of religious freedom and the protection of the Holy Places. (Fisher, 1999, Lost Opportunities) These were the realities of British support for the Zionist cause during and after World War I. The commitment to Zionism was a departure made to the Sharif and it was another important factor in crystallizing an anti-Western and anti-Zionist mode of Arab nationalism.
Palestine was still ruled as a mandate by the British much like Transjordan and Iraq but in a White Paper written by Winston Churchill in 1922 it was explained that the Brtish government meant to “to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine.” (Churchill, 1922) Churchill in the White Paper advocates for the creation of a liberal state in Palestine where its people should be allowed to have a modicum of political control and it should assure the creation stable institutions. These concerns were mainly directed at assuring the peace and tranquility of a Jewish Zionist “state” surrounded by an Arab majority in which the differences between “the Jewish religion and political Zionism began to blur in the early 1930s.” (Simon, 1997, p.102) In practice the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was a troubled idea and one that created much conflict during the Mandate period and much more so since the creation of the State of Israel. The Balfour Declaration was just another piece of British diplomacy which complicated matters and created more broken promises.
The actions of the British government during World War I and the myriad of agreements which it made with many different parties with conflicting interests created the geopolitical atmosphere for the interwar period and beyond. The Ottoman Empire was called the “Sick Man of Europe” and Britain killed during World War I. Sykes-Picot, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the Balfour Declaration made a lot of promises which could not be kept. Ultimately, the creation of the mandate system was reached as a way of crafting an uncomfortable compromise which pleased no one. This led to the creation of Arab nationalism and especially Pan-Arab and Arab unity efforts as a way of rejecting Western imperialism.
References
Anderson, S. World War I-A Hundred Years Later. Retrieved July 16, 2016, from smithsonianmag.com, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/true-story-lawrence-arabia-180951857/?page=2
Balfour, A. (1917). The Balfour Declaration. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the balfour declaration.aspx
Churchill, W. (1922). The Avalon Project : British White Paper of June 1922. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1922.asp
Enterprises, D. D. Lawrence of Arabia . King Hussein. Retrieved July 16, 2016, from pbs.org, http://www.pbs.org/lawrenceofarabia/players/hussein.html
Fisher, John. Curzon and British imperialism in the Middle East, 1916-19. Taylor & Francis, 1999.
Hunt, C. (2005). The history of Iraq. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
Hussein, S., & McMahon, H. (1916). Pre-State Israel: The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html
Osman, T. (2013, December 14). Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WW1 still rock the middle east. BBC Middle East. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553
Paris, T. J. (2004). Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule: The Sherifian Solution. Routledge.
Simon, R. S. (1974). The Hashemite ‘Conspiracy’: Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921–1958. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 5(03), 314-327.
Simon, R. S. (1997). The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-Nation State: The Case of Iraq During the Interwar Period, 1921-1941. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, 87-104.
Wright, R., Anderson, J. L., Filkins, D., & Muhanna, E. (2016, April 30). How the curse of Sykes-Picot still haunts the middle east. Retrieved July 16, 2016, from News Desk, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-curse-of-sykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east
