INTRODUCTION
With starkly different cultures and histories, the two countries have been recently pitted against each other regarding issues of austerity following the credit crises. This essay will attempt to evaluate and analyze the two countries’ electoral systems. In this endeavour, the text will attempt to confirm how each system addresses the issues of proportionality, representation of religious and ethnic minorities, durability and accountability. The essay is divided as follows. First is a theoretical discussion of electoral systems followed by a brief analysis of the two electoral systems in questions. Then a comparative analysis will attempt to classify the two systems in the above categories, with a conclusion summarizing the above arguments.
Constitutional governments tend to be divided between Majoritarian systems which operate on a concentration of power and Consensus systems which work on the dispersion of power through multi-party elections. Majoritarian systems – typically characterized by two-party systems with single-party majorities tend to be unitary in nature with a unicameral legislative branch . Consensus systems, conversely, consist of many parties with either coalition or minority governments under federal systems with bicameral legislatures .
Consensus systems emphasize representation of the many facets of electoral cleavages. The presence of multiple parties – representing the many different interests and issues that span the electorate – allows for comprehensive input and participation of these different social identities. This representation is subdivided into two different conceptualizations: dynamic representation, or responsiveness; or static representation, or congruence. Under Responsiveness, parties consist of a fluid representation which changes alongside the fluid nature of populations and their preferences. Congruent representation is a much more fixed representation and suggests matching between representatives and their electorate.
Majoritarian systems carry much more responsibility than Consensus systems as they are more susceptible to voter accountability, clarity of responsibility, retrospective and prospective voting, voter mandates, and government identifiability. Many of these refer to the degree to which governments are responsible to, and evaluated by, voters. Most important is the mandate given to Majoritarian system which represents a specific policy issue (eg. Reduce taxes, legalize gay marriage) that the party has campaigned on and which voters have effectively instructed the winning party how to legislate said issue. Retrospective voting and Prospective voting involves the electorate’s evaluation on policy mandates and how they vote in the future with respect to incumbent parties.
Horowitz identifies six “aims for an electoral system” which are important for understanding the pros and cons of different electoral systems: “1) proportionality of seats to votes; 2) accountability to constituents; 3) durable governments; 4) victory of the ‘Condorcet winner’; 5) interethnic and interreligious conciliation; and 6) minority officeholding” . The content of this text concerns itself with proportionality, accountability, durability and interethnic & interreligious conciliation in its discussion of the German and Italian electoral systems.
GERMAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
The German electoral system consists of a two-vote system described as a “mixed member proportional” system – a hybrid between majority electoral and proportional representation systems . The German system allows voters the ability to award and punish “party and MP separately” through the election of MPs during federal elections . Heinz explains that “German federal elections are party elections, where parties determine the candidate’s placement on lists and in which electoral district candidates are running” . The split-ticker voting apparatus means that most voters will split their votes between pragmatic and personal votes. The first vote, is typically for the “candidates of major political parties, like the Social democrats (SPD) or the Christian democrats (CDU/CSU)” while the second vote goes to “small parties that would never have had a chance to make it into parliament in majoritarian systems” . Ultimately, Heinz explains, that “the two major parties compete for first vote shares” while smaller parties tend to fair much better in the second vote .
This allows for the aforementioned mixed electoral system which provides for majoritarian election in the first vote and proportional representation for the second vote. Ultimately, this allows for the better accountability in the upper tier of government and better responsiveness from the lower tier. Furthermore, the stability and durability of governments is much more profound; as exemplified by German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 11-year reign.
ITALIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
The Italian system, in contrast, is characterized by instability and fractious government. The proportional representation system creates a necessity for government coalitions. These coalitions, as explained by Giannetti and Laver, are typically formed after elections results are tallied with “little discussion of post-electoral government formation” . Beyond the end of a particular government, these coalitions would dissolve, with no continuity or long-term coalition of party ideals. The electoral system consists of a “single-member plurality” election for 75 % of seats and a proportional representation for the remaining 25% . Despite a great deal of representation within government, the Italian government is typically gridlocked for two reasons. Firstly, is the weak and tenuous connections established in intra-party coalitions. The second, is the necessity for votes of confidence in both houses – resulting in the possibility of losing government through a vote of non-confidence.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As noted, both the Italian and German systems are relatively proportional in their own manners but differently so. The Italian government has a majority proportional representation government fraught with indecisiveness and fractious policy-making. Proportionality, as Horowitz describes it, PR systems can favor large parties if “competing lists are run in multimember constituencies” . Italy’s proportional representational system does excel at providing proportionality but political cartels and incentives for political collusion create instability. The German system, in contrast, mixes different levels of proportionality. The upper tier limits options to the two major parties – effectively providing the parties with an opportunity to clearly delineate their party platforms in contrast with each other. This model can either benefit popular, centrist candidates or foster polarization. In the German case, it has fostered popular and moderate candidates with clear electoral mandates as opposed to the polarizing effects that the American two-party system has incited. Chancellor Merkel has been a perfect example of the popularity of moderate candidates. The second vote, however, allows for the proportionality that increases inclusiveness in the electoral process. As noted, the second vote sets the stage for smaller parties to engage in policy-making where they would typically not have the opportunity.
The German system also aids the accountability and stability of federal governments. The Majoritarian system is susceptible to both retrospective and prospective voting – resulting in large-scale evaluations of the ruling party’s ability to fulfill the electoral mandate. The failure of a ruling party to fulfill said mandate might prompt voters to distrust their claims to represent voters’ opinions and concerns. As a result, the upper tier of German elections is much more accountable to the German people as the actions of the central government are significantly more public – the current public debate regarding the policy on refugees presents a perfect example of a wedge issue. The ability for voters to vote in smaller parties in the second vote allows for representation of both religious and ethnic minorities; Germany’s status of a top immigration destination is indicative of its positive treatment of these minority groups.
Conversely, the multiparty system employed in the Italian government reduces accountability greatly. Firstly, the multiparty system reduces the likelihood of majority governments – requiring brokered deals between individual parties. This becomes an issue because the victorious party may need to adopt certain policies and positions from smaller, fringe parties which may go against the general campaign promises of the victorious party. Secondly, the privacy surrounding political coalitions – as well as their temporary nature – reduces the party’s accountability to its supporters. If a staunchly anti-austerity party wins the election with a minority government and are unable to broker a deal with some like-minded opposition party, they may be susceptible to allying themselves with a pro-European party which advocates austerity. The anti-Austerity party would not be required to enter into this political union publicly or prior to the end of the electoral process – ultimately, circumventing the mandate that their supporters entrusted with them in order to maintain power. This creates another obstacle, as the Italian electoral system succeeds in its ability to represent religious an ethnic minorities, but is still susceptible to the political jockeying so indicative of Italian politics.
Durability of governments in both electoral systems varies heavily. As discussed, the coalitions established following Italian electoral processes are rarely discussed prior to the end of elections and seldom continue beyond a particular government. As a result, only one party has been prominent in staying a prominent member of multi-party coalitions – the Christian Democrats. Otherwise, political parties may come and go with little stability or longevity. Germany’s electoral process – due to the second system – has allowed for the durability of the ruling coalition, while the second vote allows for changing political wills and new coalitions.
CONCLUSION
Works Cited
Giannetti, Daniela and Michael Laver. "Party System Dynamics and the Making and Breaking of Italian Governments." Electoral Studies, Vol. 20 (2001): 529-553. Web.
Heinz, Dominic. Electoral System and Committee Assignment in the German Bundestag. Panel Paper. Toronto, ON: American Political Science Association, 2009. Web.
Horowitz, Donald L. "Electoral System: A primer for decision makers." Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2003): 115-127. Web.
Roberts Clark, William and et al. Principles of Comparative Politics. Washignton, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009. Print.
