Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (1968)
The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty was entered into signature in 1968 and came into force in the 1970 (Denza, 2005). The purpose of the NPT was solely based on the need to promote the proper use of nuclear energy and to reduce the spread and use of nuclear weapons globally. The need to have a peaceful world, away from the threat of nuclear wars and invasions led to a global call common approach in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. It was deemed as an amicable solution to prevent the disastrous threat that such weapons could have on world stability. The NPT has been hailed as a breakthrough in the fight against irresponsible use of nuclear energy. Major players on the world such as the USA, China, and Russia are part of the signatories of the treaty with the USA being the major source of funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Denza, 2005). Upon its inception, only one country has been able to withdrawal its membership to the treaty, the North Korea. Today, the treaty has over 168 member states who are signatories to the treaty. The treaty is built around three key pillars. These include the non-proliferation, which essentially means the common agreement by all nations to withdraw or avoid the use of nuclear weapons in any operation. The other key pillar is the peaceful use pillar which defines the agreed uses of nuclear energy acceptable to all members and those that are geared towards peaceful coexistence and development agendas. Finally, the disarmament programs pillar which seeks to compel member states who own any nuclear weapons to cease from their usage or continued development. It is important to note that these pillars are reinforced in a collaborative approach by all member nations and that the three pillars are designed to work to achieve a common objective (Cirincione, 2002). Therefore it is expected that all the pillars are correlated and that none of them can function autonomously without the input of the other pillars. This paper seeks to offer a subjective analysis of the treaty in relation to its objectives and whether the treaty has been implemented in good faith without sidelining any stakeholders or their apparent views.
In most instances, international treaties are viewed as agreements based on vested interests by the major players in the global economy. They are viewed as an apparent attempt by some powerful nations to control lesser powerful nations to submit to their interests. It is the reason as to why most international treaties generate heated reviews and opinions especially where tow powerful nations have diverging interest on the same issue. The NPT cannot be considered an exception. However, the NPT is quite extraordinary from other treaties in that the powerful nations were brought towards a common agreement by the fact that the risks involved in the irresponsible use of nuclear energy are overwhelming and cannot be adequately handled along bipartisan lines. The nations thus were forced to submit their interest on a common platform to address the issue in a much larger and powerful platform. With nations such as USA, China, and America forming part of the membership and signatories, it would thus be practically impossible to initiate a wave in their negation.
While the input of nuclear as an alternative source of energy is undeniable in the face of increasing global demand, appreciation of its potential as a deadly weapon capable of global annihilation is important. While countries continue their quest to source renewable and sustainable sources of energy, consideration on the utilization of nuclear energy is a lucrative option to consider. The established global powers such as the United States and Russia are already exploiting it for its power generation potential, in line with the treaty. However, the inclusion of developing powers on their capacity to exploit this avenue for power generation has been hindered under the agreement, which raises suspicion on the intent and willingness of the established nuclear states to oversee the transition into clean exploitation of nuclear. The exclusion of North Korea from the community of nations willing to control the exploitation of nuclear is vested on the excuse of clean exploitation of nuclear resources. However, suspicion and evidence of the state’s exploitation of this avenue for nuclear warhead production underlines the challenges that collective supervision and control of its use presents for the treaty, and global goodwill required in this joint initiative.
The powerful member states of the NPT have tried a hand on the development of nuclear weapons. However, the agreement has forced them to overlook the prospects due to the risks posed by perceived enemies such as North Korea. The need to place the security of the citizens beyond other interest played a key role in the formulation of the treaty. While on paper the treaty seems to suggest a fair playground for all signatories, it gives a much upper hand to some members than the others. To single out such an incident, is an observation of the disarmament program. At the instance of agreement that nations who had already developed nuclear weapons must cease to use them, the major concern was not placed on who should take care of the already developed weapons (Jo et al, 2007). This is because, as expected, the powerful nations, Russia and USA in particular, were accorded the responsibility of taking ownership of the weapons. Nations that were initially part of the larger USSR agreed to submit their weapons to the Russian authorities. This begs the question why some nations are more entrusted to safeguard the global security and not others.
In an apparent look at the vested interests in this treaty, the more favorable agreement that would not raise suspicion among members would be to entrust each nation to safeguard the weapons already developed rather than ask for the nations to submit the weapons to other signatories. The fare and suspicion that this approach raises could be evident in the near future as leadership among nations change each fortnight. It may come to a point where some nations question the authenticity of some nations acting as watchdogs over others while the treaty was based on mutual respect and trust. At such a point, the disarmament pillar will be under threat since nations that currently possess the upper hand in the treaty will be required to justify why other members who are equal signatories to the treaty have to be subjected to submission disguised as disarmament.
While the globe continues to experience diminishing energy reserves, the frosty and guarded exploitation of nuclear resources continues to deny the world an invaluable source of energy for its development needs. With the arising of multiple threats to international security world over, the control of nuclear, given its explosive potential as a weapon is critical. However, the limitation of the requisite technology required in the development of nuclear energy to the developing world has been seen as uncalled for in light of terrorism threat and degenerating diplomatic suspicion among the states of the world. The constricted development of nuclear capacity for developing nations has arisen as an avenue where the goodwill of the guardian states of the treaty is questioned. The will to assist in the development of the third pillar of peaceful use of nuclear energy is not seen to exist among the said states. The opacity assumed by the state of Israel on its nuclear policy is a case in point where there seems to be no equality in the treatment of nations willing to exploit nuclear (Ruzicka, 2010). While Israel is understood to use nuclear for peaceful means, its conflict with the state of Palestine offers it incentive to develop nuclear armament for military use. The confidence accorded to the state of Israel on its ability to develop and responsibly exploit nuclear technology may cause suspicion on the criteria used to sanction nuclear capacity among states of the world. The fact that such a state is not a member to the treaty does not limit initiatives that would be taken out of the treaty, by leading powers of goodwill to compel it to sign up, or shed light on its nuclear activity.
The first pillar of the treaty calls for the non-proliferation, with much concern being the need to avoid or withdraw from the development of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation pillar calls for the continued exchange of scientific information related to nuclear technology among nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. While such recommendations seem to provide a platform where trust can be adhered, the treaty fails to provide a scheme that can ensure that member states adhere to this rule. No one can rule in certainty that nations have continuously shared information especially when it touches on security matters. Such suspicion is what will yield to discontent among member states and in the long run facilitate opposing views. The treaty while being successful in the short term, there are concerns as to what may arise in the event that some nations are found to be harboring scientific ambitions related to nuclear weapon development. This will signal the dead end of a sustaining agreement.
While it is important for the existence of a clique of nations tasked with the control and supervision of nuclear exploitation, the leeway allowed for their legal holding of nuclear head stockpiles, within the allowances of the treaty creates the excuse by other nations to develop heads of their own. The key pillar within the treaty, the pillar of disarmament is not seen to be respected by the leading nuclear states, owing to their unwillingness to further disarm. Some nations holding nuclear arms in their stores, with others required to surrender ones in their existence creates mistrust on the intentions of the armed states with their arm stocks. For this pillar to achieve its required effect, it would be progressive for the leading nuclear states to show the willingness towards achieving zero stocks of nuclear arms. In the attainment of such a feat, the rest of the global community would be easier to compel against creating these arms. Holding of nuclear arms is done primarily as a countermeasure against states holding similar arms, therefore, the continued creation and holding of nuclear arms by some states will continue to spur the need to arm by states that feel threatened by a nuclear invasion.
The presence of nations such as North Korea who feel that they should not be governed by such a treaty may widen, and nations will justify the belief that they can handle their weaponry development agendas as much as North Korea has done without putting the world at risk (Niksch, 2005). The IAEA should in consultation with all member states seek to retain its trust among members while engaging nations such as North Korea ion this programs rather than continued sidelining of the nations. It begs the question how ready the other nations are in the case that a nation such as North Korea decides to use the nuclear weapons to wage a nuclear war in the event that it fells that its national security issues are at risk. No one can categorically state that the powerful nations have not set put a road map to combat such an unfortunate event. It thus leads to the question of whether any information has been shared with the other member states to assure them of support under such circumstances.
In this endeavor, to develop, while at the same time securing our world, it is paramount the stakeholders take on an approach of trust and responsibility with each other. The current situation seems to aggravate the threat of nuclear armament rather than inhibiting it. The more that countries are seen to get a raw deal on the preparedness and ability to exploit nuclear responsibly, the more that they will seek illicit avenues to develop and exploit this resource. The interrelatedness of the nuclear exploitation with global politics is undeniable but the more that they are treated as inseparable, the more the risk of the nuclear threat to world populations is increased. There are no apparent winners or losers in a nuclear war, as is apparent from lessons of our past. Therefore, a common strategy in the use or disuse of nuclear technology should be adopted by all the nations, with some seen as more capable than the others are in handling nuclear technology. It would be more feasible to allow increased use of nuclear technology for its power generating potential, than continue in the segregation policy currently employed. When more nations are able to use nuclear, the transparency possible in its exploitation would reduce the current tensions associated with its use, and thus reduce the possibility of nations holding nuclear weapons as an insurance against unpredictable intentions of nations, legally allowed to hold these arms (Shultz, 2007).
References
Cirincione, J., Wolfsthal, J. B., & Rajkumar, M. (2002). Deadly arsenals: Tracking weapons of mass destruction. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Denza, E. (2005). Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons The European Union and Iran. European Foreign Affairs Review, 10(3), 289.
Jo, D. J., & Gartzke, E. (2007). Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation.Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(1), 167-194.
Kokoski, R. (1995). Technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Niksch, L. A. (2005, January). North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.
Ruzicka, J., & Wheeler, N. J. (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty. International Affairs, 86(1), 69-85.
Shultz, G. P., Perry, W. J., Kissinger, H. A., & Nunn, S. (2007). A world free of nuclear weapons. Wall Street Journal, 4, A15.
