Many in government and in the media have been extremely critical of the intelligence community, and in particular the FBI (Federal Bureau of investigation) because of the failure to detect and prevent the attacks by terrorists on 9/11. In the immediate aftermath a congressional inquiry into the attacks pointed specifically to the FBI for its prior failure to focus on possible domestic terrorism. In particular, this inquiry found that the FBI failed to collect useful intelligence, carefully analyze the intelligence they did have and (perhaps most importantly) to quickly and fully share the results of their intelligence gathering with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies (JIC Inquiry, p. 37.). In fact, the disaster of 9/11 is widely considered to be the most significant intelligence failure suffered by the United States since the attack on Pearl Harbor (Odom, p. p. ix). In response to its critics, the FBI is taking measures to attempt to develop a intelligence capacity better suited to the realities of the 21st century. These measures include the improvement of their intelligence structure, as well as their computer networking capacity and their communication systems (Mueller). Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear to the FBI, with these changes, has effectively its shortcomings as a domestic intelligence agency. Critics suggest that more drastic changes may be necessary, including the creation of an entirely new and separate agency tasked with carrying out domestic intelligence. This agency would be somewhat similar to Britain's MI-5 organization. This paper will examine these issues.
Despite the critics, there are many who believe that steps taken by the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI director are more than sufficient and entirely appropriate to provide for US needs in the area of domestic intelligence and anti-terrorism operations. In this view, there is no conflict between the FBI's law enforcement responsibilities and those that it carries for intelligence gathering and anti-terror activities. In fact, many believe that the FBI's law enforcement arm only serves to enhance its intelligence gathering and anti-terrorism goals (Cumming, p. 1).
The FBI is also made recent efforts to increase the number of experienced and trained intelligence officers within its organization. In the past, intelligence analysts were often assigned to positions in administration, rather than active analytical work. In addition, because critics have suggested that FBI agents receive too little training in active and offensive intelligence gathering operations, the FBI has also increased the required hours of intelligence training for agents in its training program.
However despite the significant efforts made by the FBI to improve its intelligence gathering, update its computer and communication systems, and to improve its communications with and interaction with other intelligence agencies (such as the CIA) many of its critics claim that these efforts have been insufficient and poorly handled. In essence, these critics believed that the FBI's traditions and history produce a organizational inertia that prevents them from making truly effective changes in their intelligence philosophy and techniques. From their perspective, these critics believe that the FBI is making what amounts to cosmetic changes to its organization that will not translate into effective intelligence work against the terrorists. These critics believe that only a major reform can address this shortcoming in US domestic intelligence, and many of them believe this requires the creation of entirely new agency.
Those who support this approach suggests that the creation of a new agency tasked with counterintelligence, one that is totally unconnected with the other federal intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the FBI, is the ideal solution to detect and interdict any impending terrorist attacks against the United States. In this approach, the FBI would concentrate on its domestic crime investigation activities and shed itself of any responsibilities for investigating or confronting domestic terrorism. This agency would be the United States equivalent of Great Britain's and MI-5 (Odom, p.182).
There are a number of different ideas about the precise role but this new agency would play, with some suggesting that it should be in charge of all cattle intelligence, both within United States and abroad (Odom p.183). On the other hand, it may be that this agency would focus entirely on domestic intelligence gathering (Cumming, p. 1). In either case, the current intelligence capabilities and personnel located within the FBI would be transferred to this new agency. Because the new agency would be entirely devoted to intelligence gathering and assessment, it would not have the ability to make arrests. Instead, it would inform the Department of Justice if it had obtained intelligence that clearly required action on the part of the government.
Those who oppose this approach point to the fact that the FBI has never confined itself only to law enforcement activities, and that it has a long history of successfully carrying out intelligence gathering operations in the United States. One former Attorney General suggested that the idea of creating a separate domestic intelligence agency apart from the FBI is, " preposterous and goes in exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counterterrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this area (Barr, p.18)."
References
Alfred Cumming, Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2004) p. 1 Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Barr, William P. (former United States Attorney General) Testimony in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003.
FBI website at: www.fbi.gov/intelligence/intell.htm
Odom, William E. Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director of the FBI, in U.S. Congress, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. May 2, 2006.
