Introduction
A few decades long conflict between Russia and Ukraine has reached its culminating point recently when Russia made a military invasion into the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and forcefully annexed them to the Russian Federation in the early 2014. This event has raised a huge controversy in the world. Several world leaders, including NATO, have vehemently criticized and opposed to this illegal annexation of the Ukrainian territory, by which the Russian Federation completely violated the assurance it had extended to Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin cited that the annexation was necessary as the ethnic Russians, which constituted the larger population of Crimea, were facing immense oppression from the Ukrainian government and public in general. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has the breeding ground dating back to the time when two decades ago after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine was separated from the Russian Federation and was declared an independent state. This paper would discuss the issue in greater detail, highlighting the history of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the recent developments, and the possible solutions.
Historical Background of the Conflicts
Historically, Ukraine was considered a sub-division of the imperial Russia. However, the Bolshevik government acknowledged Ukraine as a separate East Slavic nation. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties with each other in the initial years. However, conflicts between the two nations soon surfaced. There were several factors that contributed to the conflict. The first dispute that arose between Ukraine and Russia in between 1992-1993 was over the denuclearization of Ukraine (McLaughlin 2014). Ukraine had physical though not operational control on the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile of the world. However, Ukraine, in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, agreed to transfer the nuclear arsenal to Russia on the given condition that Russia along with other signatories like the USA and the UK would give an assurance that no threats or the use of force will ever be applied to Ukraine. In return for this assurance, Ukraine gave up its right on the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Since the beginning of 1994, the second point of contention developed between the two nations over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea, and it grew as a dominant aspect of the relationship between the two countries. The Crimean peninsula has turned into the main reason for the duel between Moscow and Kiev on political, military, economic, and territorial disputes (McLaughlin 2014). In order to understand this issue in-depth, it is important to take a look back at the historical background of these countries.
Russia’s Opposition to Ukraine’s Secession
Ukraine was declared an independent state in 1991 when over 90% of the Ukrainian population voted in favor of independence. However, most of the Russians were not happy with Ukraine's secession. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who is the head of the Liberal Democratic Party, represents the trend of Russian nationalism that anti-Western, anti-reformist, revanchist, and chauvinistic. According to him, there is only Russia, no Ukraine, and no Russian Federation either (Zaborksy 1995). Several Russian politicians too expressed their opposition to the formation of Ukraine as an independent state. If possible, they would like to recreate the old Soviet Union. The majority of the Russian population holds this view. Sergei Baburin, who is one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front, declared to the Ukrainian Ambassador in Moscow that if Ukraine does not unite with Russia, "there will be war" (Zaborksy 1995). Russia, still imperial in its mentality, is, therefore, viewed as a natural and historical enemy of the independent Ukraine, and hence, the Ukrainians want their securities tightened against Russia more than ever.
Russia has also various strategic and geopolitical reasons for objecting to the secession of Ukraine. Firstly, Ukraine shares its border with some of the densely populated provinces of the Russian Federation, and because of this, the demographic and geographic influence of Ukraine spreads to the very heart of Russia. Secondly, the Black Sea and the sea ports in Mariupol, Nickolaev, Odessa, and Il'ichovsk were an important economic factor in the former Soviet Union, with these ports providing over 20% of the export supplies to the former Russia. The trans-European gas pipelines, such as "Sojuz" and "Bratstvo", and the oil pipeline "Druzhba" pass through the Ukrainian territory (Zaborksy 1995). These facilities were considerably important for the economy of the former Soviet Union as well as the current day Russia. Ukraine's independence would cut Russia off from these facilities of Europe, and hence, Russia's primary objective is to prevent Ukraine from forming a new trade relationship with Europe, which might pose a competition to Russia.
Thirdly, Ukraine contributed significantly to the economy of the former Soviet Union by producing approximately 40% of steel, 35% of coal, and a considerable amount of food products (McLaughlin 2014). Therefore, the Russian Federation would be at a greater advantage if the industrial, scientific, and agricultural potential of Ukraine came under direct and indirect control of Moscow. Fourthly, Ukraine also played an important role in the Soviet military and industry, and about 25% of all the Soviet weapons and missiles were produced by Ukrainian companies (Zaborksy 1995). Ukraine's secession breaks this mutual cooperation, which might impact the defense administration of Russia. One of the top primary objectives of the Russian leadership is to restore this military-industrial cooperation with Ukraine. Fifthly, Ukraine has a big military infrastructure that provided service to the former Soviet Union. Some elements of this infrastructure are still crucial for Russia, especially, Sevastopol, which was an important naval base of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet. If Russia wants to protect its military and strategic interests against the Southwestern and Western Europe, then it will have to spend a lot of money in building a new military infrastructure, which might not be sufficient for Russia's aspiration of retaining its superpower image in the region (Zaborksy 1995). Because of all these reasons, Russia does not want to lose its control on Ukraine and tries to retain its strategic presence and control in the Black Sea and the port of Sevastopol.
The Issue of Crimea
The former Soviet Union appended Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. However, the majority of the Crimean population is Russian, with only about 26% of the Crimean population being ethnic Ukrainians. Therefore, for long, Crimea wanted to separate from the control of Ukraine. Russia, in order to pressurize Ukraine to give up its claim on the Black Sea Fleet, began to question the Ukrainian control of Crimea, and investigating the circumstances in which Crimea was annexed to Ukraine, Russia declared the annexation of Crimea to Ukraine illegal in 1992 (Cohen 2014). The main objective of Russia was to retrieve Sevastopol, the key naval base located on the Crimean Peninsula, from the control of Ukraine.
The recent forceful Crimean annexation to the Russian Federation is an aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution and Euromaidan movement that took place in February 2014 when the pro-Russian Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich refused to sign The Ukraine-European Association Agreement, a treaty that would have established a political and economic association between Ukraine and the European Union. After Viktor Yanukovich was appointed as the President of Ukraine in 2010, he also hurt the national sentiments of the Ukrainian population by renewing the lease of Sevastopol, allowing the Russian troops to continue its presence in the Black Sea (Lieven 2014). Many Ukrainians view the renewal of the lease as unconstitutional, because the constitution of Ukraine clearly states that once the Sevastopol treaty expired, no foreign troops will be permanently stationed in Ukraine. Not only this, Yulia Timoshenko, who was the main opposition leader of Yanukovich was also imprisoned on charges that many believed as fabricated (Orr 2014). All these created enough dissent in the minds of common people against Yanukovich, and hence, a wave of protests took place in Ukraine when the association agreement was not signed with the EU, resulting in the escape of Yanukovich from the country and the invasion of the Russian military to Ukraine.
Possible Solution
The solution to the problem needs to address both the long and short term needs of Ukraine and Russia and also of West. Russia has already broken its promise by invading Ukraine. However, in order to reach a solution, Russia needs to come to an agreement together with the EU and other interested stakeholders concerning the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Now that the primary bone of contention, the naval base of Sevastopol, has gone under the control of Russia, Russia needs to give assurance of its non-intervention in Ukrainian matters (Draitser 2014). In return, the guarantee that the ethnic Russians would be given protection throughout Ukraine should be assured by the Ukrainian government.
In most of the political crises, there is no quick or easy solution. Crimea, which is part of Ukraine, has a larger Russian population and also hosts the majority of Ukraine’s industry. Ukraine’s export mostly goes to Russia. In fact, more than 50% of Ukraine’s industrial and agricultural output is exported to Russia. The gas requirement of Ukraine is totally fulfilled by Russia. Therefore, even if the EU and America know that the forceful secession of Crimea by Russian forces is wrong, but in the long run, in order to survive and flourish, Ukraine needs to come to a peaceful solution with Russia (Lieven 2014). One solution could be that Russia leaves Crimea and in return Russia gets to share the Sevastopol port along with Ukraine military. We have to understand Russian politicians. They often do not understand the international laws and treaties. Therefore, any agreement between two countries must be reached with heavy involvement of Russia. This may sound a little biased towards Russia, but actually if a peaceful agreement can be reached, then that will benefit Ukraine in the long run more than Russia. Otherwise, Ukraine will have to live in fear of its neighbor and will be spending most of its budget in military activities and less in developments.
Conclusion
Russia - Ukraine conflict is not an easy one to solve. Although the way Russia entered Ukraine and annexed Crimea to the Russian Federation with military forces may seem totally against international laws and treaties, but it is not that simple. Crimea is a region dominated by ethnic Russian population and also hosts the majority of Ukraine’s industries. At present, Ukraine’s economy is highly dependent on its export to Russia. Therefore, if external forces like NATO interfere and force the Russian military out of Crimea, it will not end the conflict. In fact, it will worsen, and Ukraine will have to live in constant fear from its neighbor in the coming days. It will be better that world leaders get into a discussion with the heads of the two countries and come to a joint agreement, where not only Ukraine gets back their control on Crimea and sovereignty, but Russia too would continue its presence in Sevastopol. The assurance of proper handling of the ethnic Russian population of Crimea should also be guaranteed by Ukraine.
Work Cited
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McLaughlin, Lauren. "The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: A Harvard Scholar Explains". Harvard Summer School. 2014. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.summer.harvard.edu/blog-news-events/conflict-ukraine-historical-perspective>
Cohen, Tom. "Is Crimea Gone? Annexation No Longer The Focus Of Ukraine Crisis”. CNN. 1 Apr. 2014. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/politics/crimea-explainer/>
Orr, Robert. "Why Crimea matters to Russia". The Financial Times. 3 Mar. 2014. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/03/why-crimea-matters-to-russia/>
Lieven, Anatol. "How can the West solve its Ukraine problem?". BBC. 3 Dec . 2014. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30278606>
Draitser, Eric. Solving the crisis in Ukraine. Autonomous Nonprofit Organization (ANO). 19 Mar. 2014. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. <http://rt.com/op-edge/crisis-ukraine-russia-influence-570/>
