The rapid advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) against Iraqi forces represents yet another critical milestone in Iraq’s turbulent recent history. The policy options available to the United States are complicated by the regional dimensions of the conflict and the divergent interests of key players, most notably Iran, Syria, Russia, a loose coalistion of Western countries and Sunni-regimes in the region. While most of the policy options may be framed as a search for the “least bad” policy to address this quagmire, there may be a path worth exploring to transform the situation into a rare opportunity for Sunni-Shiite collaboration in Iraq.
- Selected historical milestones: a downward spiral
While it is no longer useful to reflect on the decision making process that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it remains important to cast current developments in the context of two specific developments in the post invasion governance of Iraq. These were the catastrophic decision by Paul Bremer, then the top civilian administrator of the former Coalition Provisional Authority, to launch a comprehensive “de-Baathification” of Iraqi leadership and disbanding of the Iraqi Army, and the subsequent decision by the first post invasion Prime Minister, Maliki, to solely protect Shiite interests at the expense of a multi-sectarian population.
Whatever logic prevailed to convince Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney to favor a de-baathification process, it is now undisputed that the decision to purify the governing echelon of the country of Baath party members was an extraordinary blunder. It is also worth noting that the decisions, encapsulated in CPA order 1, and CPA order 2, were made against the advice of US military and CIA professionals. In essence, the combination of these policies resulted in hundreds of thousands of skilled military and civilian professionals becoming alienated, with no means of supporting their families, who ultimately became insurgents angry at the United States, with significant inventories of weapons and professional military training.
One of the priorities established by the U.S. was to install a Democratic process in Iraq. An Iraqi Transitional Government was cobbled together to act in a caretaker capacity, until such time as free elections could be orchestrated. An Iraqi National Assembly was re-constituted and a general election was held in December 2015. This first post-Saddam election resulted in the emergence of Nouri Al-Malaki in May 20, 2006. Not surprisingly, the process of forming a new government was chaotic and a balancing act was required for the first Prime Minister to put together a working coalition. There were multiple priorities, such as the need to reboot oil production, the challenge brought about by a restless Kurdish minority intent on achieving some degree of autonomy, the need to manage historical tension between Sunni and Shiite minorities, and of course a strategy to manage the relationship with the United States. What ensued, was the opposite of what the United States had envisioned. Rather than bringing about a functioning democracy based on inclusive principles, Al Maliki inexorably moved toward a Sectarian leader who prioritized Shiite interests and marginalized Sunni leaders and communities. This may have been foreseen in light of Iran’s rising influence post Saddam, but the U.S. had expected Al Maliki to manage the dual influences of the United States and Iran. In effect, Maliki opted to tilt toward Iran and planted the seed for a level of Sunni discontent, which formed the basis for today’s ISIL movement.
In 2014, unable to orchestrate a viable response to ISIL’s military campaign, Prime Minister Al Maliki resigned from office and led the way for a successor to emerge. Haider Al-Abadi was designated as Prime Minister by President Fuad Masum on 11 August 2014 to succeed Nouri al-Maliki and was approved by the Iraqi parliament on 8 September 2014. His challenges are many, but most critical will be the twin goals of successfully preventing the conquest of Iraq by ISIL and, if successful, to find a navigate a path that will bring Iraqi Sunnis back into shared governance of the country.
- What is at stake: a multi-dimensional current and future crisis
What began as an Iraqi problem quickly morphed into a multi-dimensional crisis that is still enfolding. Over the 11 years since the United States invasion, the landscape around Iraq changed considerably. Without prioritizing these dimensions of the crisis, it is necessary to consider each individual dimension before attempting to converge them toward a set of recommendations.
- Syria: Against the backdrop of a regional “Arab Spring”, nationwide protests began in Spring 2011 against President Bashar al-Assad's government, whose forces responded with violent crackdowns. Having taken the reign of powers in 2000, Bashar al-Assad had little preparation in the area of governance and opted to solidify his hold on power by responding with overwhelming force. What started as popular protests morphed into a full armed rebellion. The level of casualties reached nearly 200,000 by 2014 and the flow of refugees seeking an escape from Assad’s fire brutal repression presented an unforeseen regional crisis, with over 6 million Syrians fleeing to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq.
In Syria, U.S. interests and values present a conflicting set of considerations. The (Obama) Administration opted to abstain from any additional military engagement in the region, consistent with a 2008 campaign platform that prioritized disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan. While the French government argued in favor of intervention in light of the rising humanitarian crisis, the West’s combined response has been to “oscillate between explicit demands for President Bashar al-Assad to leave and implicit acceptance of him as a viable partner in UN-brokered peace negotiations”. The U.S. declared values around the desire to support democratic principles, in light of the cost of engagement in support, came into direct conflict with political, military and economic realities in the United States where a decade of military engagement led to fatigue and the expected lack of broad political support for yet another military adventure in the Middle East.
Yet today, ISIL’s reach into Syria as part of its strategy of creating a modern day Caliphate creates a no win situation for the U.S. ISIL came to be in Iraq, but now it has succeeded in presenting a regional vision of Islamic leadership. If ISIL were allowed to consolidate its footprint in Syria, it would perhaps bring about the fall of Assad, but it would do little to bring about an Arab Spring and the hoped-for democratization of Syria. Hence the US options, in Syria, are limited to a) help defeat ISIL in Syria, thereby helping Assad stay in power, b) focus its efforts elsewhere and allow ISIL to consolidate its base in Syria or c) hope that someone else will take on ISIL forces in Syria.
- Iran: A traditional foe of the United States ever since Khomeini seized power in 1979, Iran has emerged as the beneficiary of Iraq’s transition from a Sunni dictatorship under Saddam Hussein, to a Shiite-dominated pseudo-democracy under Al Maliki and since 2014 under Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. For over a decade, U.S. policy toward Iran has shifted from a generic admonishment about Iran’s maligned and backwards slide away from the secular potential of a modern and educated Iran, to a specific concern about Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Once contained around an axis comprised of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the U.S. failure to bring about a successful post Sadam transition in Iraq has added a formidable asset to the Shiite block. Iraq’s population, geographic footprint and oil reserves add considerable heft to the Shiite block, a development not lost on the traditional U.S. Sunni ally, Saudi Arabia.
Just as it chose to not intervene during the Syrian civil protests, the United States chose not to intervene when Iranian students rose in a protest that became Iran’s equivalent of Tianamen Square. Once again the values of democratic support ran against the limits of Realpolitik. US Government priority shifted to the existential threat posed by Iran’s potential possession of a nuclear weapons capability. Under the current (Obama) Administration, direct negotiations have been shepherded by US Secretary of State John Kerry, under the “5 plus 1” diplomatic construct (U.S., France, Russia, Britain, China, Germany – and Iran) and, as of December 10, 2014 were allowed to extend toward a hoped-for resolution by a new deadline of July 2015. While it is premature to prognosticate on the outcome of the “5 plus 1” negotiations, the very fact that the United States altered its decades-old refusal to engage with Iran is in and of itself a form of diplomatic movement in the region.
As of December 2014, the U.S. finds itself in a peculiar strategic position in Iraq. The U.S. is actively challenging ISIL’s advance in Iraq, through targeted bombing campaigns to destroy ISIL assets on the ground in Iraq, the supply of military hardware, the provision of logistics to the Iraqi military and military training personnel to support Iraqi forces. These activities take place alongside, though officially not in coordination with, Iran’s synergistic efforts to tackle ISIS in Iraq. This convergence of national interests between the United States and Iran may become a turning point in the United States’ posture in the region, and forms the basis for our recommendations relative to US policy in Iraq.
- Russia: Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has re-emerged as a strategic and military adversary to the West. Putin’s decision to absorb Crimea after Ukraine’s tilt toward Europe for its economic and political development, was the turning point in a perceptible gradual move toward a muscled policy to achieve a multi-polar world where Russia’s former glory might be revisited. This is germane because any decision with regard to Iraq now must be calibrated against increasingly unpredictable reactions by Putin’s Russia.
In short, U.S. policy toward Iraq, in light of ISIL’s emergence as a proponent of a modern day Caliphate, needs to consider not only Iraq’s current state and future development, but also how any policy will influence a delicate balance of power that encompass Iran, Syria and Russia. There are of course multiple other considerations, such as ISIL’s emerging threat to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and ultimately Israel.
- Alternative futures – considering options and likely outcomes
In light of the above, U.S. policy options cover a broad range of considerations, which address core concerns around the priority of preventing the emergence of a nuclear capability in the region (Iran), the limitation and ultimately destruction of ISIL (Iraq and Syria), the protection of access to oil (Iraq, Saudi Arabia), the alleviation of the enfolding humanitarian crisis (Iraq, Syria), the maintenance of pro-western Sunni Muslim countries (Turkey, Saudi Arabia) and the limitation of US exposure to another round of troop commitments in the region.
A broad palette of options avails itself to the United States, each with its own risks and rewards. These are presented below as the order of increasing breadth of engagement:
- Hands Off: This option would be a departure from current policy to support Iraqi forces as they seek to tackle ISIL forces. The merits of a disengagement policy would be to limit current US exposure and to inevitable political attack during the 2016 election cycle along the line of a failed “mission accomplished” narrative in Iraq, as US military engagement would be sustained even after a decision was made to withdraw US forces from Iraq. The major drawback from this policy would be that the Administration would further fuel international concerns about a U.S. inward looking policy and disengagement from its traditional international leadership position. This would likely create a vacuum that Russia and China and possibly other actors would seize upon to carry out expansionist policies in various theaters.
- Status Quo: This option keeps the U.S. engaged in Iraq, albeit in a support role. The success of this approach depends entirely on the desire and ability of the Iraqi government to respond to ISIL’s challenge on the ground. The merit of this approach is that it could help the new government of Prime Minister Al-Abadi to quickly “mature”, successfully turn the tide against ISIL and set the stage for a period of stability in Iraq. Inherent in this approach is the tacit acceptance by the U.S. that it support a regime that would be develop an equidistant relationship with the United States and its arch-enemy, Iran. The downside of this approach is that it is as yet unclear whether Iraq’s military will be able to muster the strength, organizational coordination and stamina to fight ISIL for years and perhaps decades. The risk is indeed high that Prime Minister Al-Abadi (or any successor) will fail to contain ISIL and that the country may be over-run, allowing ISIL to consolidate its Caliphate footprint in Iraq. Practically, this would result in a triple crisis of epic proportion, namely as a result of ISIL getting enormous economic benefit from being able to tap Iraq’s oil to fuel ISIL’s expansionist ambitions, ISIL’s access to a cache of weapons accumulated in Iraq and an enormous Public Relations victory that would play on Muslim pride and assuredly result in an increased flow of volunteers to carry out the Caliphate’s mission.
- Nation Building – one refugee at a time: It is a truism of US Foreign Policy that the U.S. is consistently more effective at rallying support in favor of military “destructive” campaigns, that it is at organizing “constructive” nation building campaigns. The notable exception to this reality was the Marshall Plan that helped Europe rebound after WWII. Yet, the degree of attractiveness of the ISIL brand can be traced to both a muscled “anti-heathens” rhetoric and to the dearth of economic incentives for young Sunni Muslims to build their future around economic rather than military activities. Practically, there are now millions of refugees dispersed throughout the region, and many more to come if ISIL is able to continue its military thrusts into Iraq and Syria. This policy option consists in a twin campaign of focusing all efforts on breaking ISIL’s momentum in Iraq while organizing unprecedented levels of Foreign Direct Investments to build up economic opportunities and welcome refugees from the region into Iraq. The vision here is to demonstrate with a large infusion of technical capability, market-driven demand for products and funding from Saudi Arabia, China – both passive observers of the ISIL conflict with large financial capability – that there is an alternative future for disgruntled Sunni Iraqis and regional refugees. The downside of this policy recommendation is that the United States is notoriously weak at articulating a comprehensive and sustained nation-building campaign.
- Protect Iraq / Sink Syria: It is evident that the threat that ISIL represents is neither limited in scope nor in time. It will take a sustained effort for U.S. allies to address this threat. It would be as well delusional to think that the ISIL threat will simply evaporate. It won’t. It can, at best, be contained or shaped in ways that may support US interests. In that context, and in light of a) America’s prior policy (and responsibility?) with regard to Iraq and b) Assad’s un-confronted crimes against the Syrian people, one policy option would be to put all of the West’s chips on Iraq and secure the destruction of ISIL in Iraq. This would require a stepped-up level of military engagement in the form of US military hardware, logistics and training support and comprehensive air campaigns to disrupt and destroy any and all ISIL forces on the ground. It would also require an element of the previously proposed economic development policy to create jobs and build up an economic success story on the ground in Iraq. The merits of this policy is that it would channel limited resources toward blocking ISIL in Iraq, would shake the very premise of ISIL as an Iraq-based Caliphate and could be expected to shift ISIL focus to the Syrian theater. This would enable the prioritization of efforts toward denying ISIL access to Iraqi oil. The downside of this policy is that it would signal ISIL that its efforts should be redirected toward Syria, creating an influx in military activities in Syria and creating a still greater humanitarian crisis in Syria. However, if Iraq can be motivated to open its gate to Syrian refugees and see this as a vehicle toward economic development for the long term, the policy could result in bottling up ISIL in Syria and letting Assad deal with a crisis partially of his own making. Iran would surely not be attracted by this policy option, but it could be persuaded to view the approach as a “divide and conquer” approach where US and Iranian resources are deployed to address the two-state threat that ISIL has so far been able to execute, with US focusing on Iraq and Iran focusing on Syria.
- Break the pattern of Sunni-Shiite conflict: A slight variant from this past option is to create an epochal opportunity out of this crisis. There should be little doubt in Sunni Muslim capitals that a rising ISIL will only expand its reach. Whether ISIL chooses to first target Turkey or Saudi Arabia, these so-called “staunch allies” of the West, must recognize that the ISIL threat is not neatly framed by a Sunni versus Shiite narrative. While Turkey under Prime Minister Erdogan has taken a decisively pro Islamic tilt, there is every reason to believe that Turkey would not welcome ISIS expanding its reach into Turkey and taking the mantle of a modern-day Ottoman empire. Likewise, the fragile hold on power of the Saudi royal family could be quickly shaken should ISIL turn its sight more aggressively on Saudi Arabia. Therefore, both countries, as well as Egypt, Jordan and the UAE, to name just a few, could be brought into a formidable single purpose alliance, alongside Iran, Irak and Syria to defeat ISIL. A Sunni-Shiite grouping seems as far fetched today as a US – Iran tacit coordination seemed yesterday. And yet, this unexpected convergence of national interests is evolving into a de facto reality on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. The merits of this policy is that it would not only set into motion a strongest yet alliance of anti-ISIL partners, but also would set the stage for a broader construct of reduced tension between Sunni and Shiite states in the region. A corollary to this approach is that it would create a common “enemy” that is not Israel, the traditional default for bellicose rhetoric in the region. The downside is that orchestrating this unlikely alliance would be tremendously difficult and take time that reality on the battlefield does not allow. This could be addressed, however, by having the U.S. make a historic move in concert with Iran’s leadership, toward this objective. Saudi Arabia would be extremely perplexed by a sudden shift toward Iran and may fear becoming isolated, joining, reluctantly and gradually this effort. The United States would need to secure the initial participation of some Sunni partners, such as Jordan, Turkey or Egypt, in a grand alliance, so as to facilitate Saudi Arabia’s entry into such an alliance.
- Recommendation:
There are many obstacles on the road to building a viable force to counter ISIL. These are early days in what could become a multi-decade engagement to combat an alternative multi-domestic and amorphous Islamic Caliphate. The recommended approach is to turn the quagmire of Iraq into a long-term opportunity to change the regional dynamics away from a sectarian combat zone. Just as the United States is engaged in a two front strategy to negotiate with Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons capability and to tactically acknowledge Iran’s military engagement in Iraq alongside U.S. military advisors, so can traditional Sunni Arab regimes come to swallow the bitter bill of their historic religious discord to work pro-actively toward the establishment of demonstrator of a multi-sectarian, economically vibrant Iraq. Specifically, it is proposed that a grand alliance be negotiated with Iran on one hand and with a cluster of Sunni partners on the other. This vision can be achieved through a gradual move from recommendation c, d and finally e. Focusing the fight in Iraq, in coordination with Iran, will create a refocus of ISIL onto Syria. The “space” opened in Iraq can become a homeland for Syrian refugees who, with international funding (from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Western Europe and China), and sustained coordination, can be built toward becoming a model of economic success in Iraq. Just as ISIL is setting itself up to become a regional force over the next decades, so can the West, with due coordination and collaboration between Sunni and Shiite regimes, work toward demonstrating a different model. This model of economic success would do as much to deflect ISIL’s appeal as would defeat on the battlefield. China, loathe to participate in the Middle East’s tragic puzzle, yet dependent as it is on Middle Eastern oil, would have a role to play as a source of financing, industrial capability development and as a ready market with preferred treatment for goods “make in Iraq”. Russia seems in no mood to participate in any Western-oriented alliances and would be left to choose whether to join in on the Iraqi experiment, or focus its effort on supporting its traditional ally – Syria. Either way, Russia’s contribution would be productive in this context.
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