Introduction
The Caucasus is a region, characterized by diverse ethnic and religious composition and the high number of ethnic conflicts and separatist regions. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet states of this region witnessed and suffered numerous confrontations on the ethnic ground and faced several claims for separation and independence. Azerbaijan and Armenia confronted each other because of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory; Chechnya was a problematic region of Russian Federation, striving and fighting for independence, as a result, suffered two wars; and Georgia – a tiny mountainous state that shares borders with Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, witnessed a civil war and lost control on its two regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia (about one third of its territory) in the first decade of its existence as an independent state (Goltz 2009, 19). The conflict over separatist regions was ‘frozen’ during about fourteen years and ‘reheated’ again in August of 2008, when the situation escalated and resulted in five day war between Russian Federation and Georgia. Only diplomatic efforts of European countries prevented the wide-scale invasion of Georgia by Russian troops and managed to reach a ceasefire agreement, followed by an official recognition of ‘independent states’ of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia, and mutual accusations of starting the war by Moscow and Tbilisi.
This paper will provide the history, background and development of this conflict and analyze it in the framework of Lebow’s Between Peace and War; introduce the participants of the conflict and analyze their motivation, calculations and perception of themselves, an adversary, and the world.
Background
The history of conflict between Georgia and separatist territories did not begin in 2008. The origins of this confrontation and claims for independence started at the time of the collapse of Soviet Union. The Georgian nationalist movement, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, struggled against the Soviet Union and succeeded, as the USSR collapsed and Georgia gained independence. However, the nationalist statements of Gamsakhurdia “Georgia for the Georgians” in the multi-ethnic Georgia (Goltz 2009, 16), led to side effects: the ethnic minorities – Abkhazians and Ossetians feared that the autonomy they had under the Soviet rule, would be taken by independent Georgia, and sought support in Moscow. Additionally, in the 1990s, Georgia was a weak state with particularly non-existing governmental structures, chaos and fight for power (Cheterian 2009, 157). In these conditions, separatist conflicts were hard to manage and resolve, as President Gamsakhurdia struggled to maintain his office, was defeated and was forced to flee the country (Goltz 2009, 20; Gordadze 2009, 30). Next, the situation deteriorated further because of the inconsistent, ambiguous policies of the Shevardnadze administration towards the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Shevardnadze alternated promises of peaceful negotiations with the participation of international actors, broad autonomy to separatist regions and threats and attempts to forcefully reintegrate Abkhazia by unofficial, guerilla forces in 1998 and 2001 (Cheterian 2009, 157-58). After the Rose Revolution, under the Saakashvili administration, the Georgian state considerably strengthened. The partnership and ties with the United States and the European Union enhanced, announcing Georgia’s willingness to enter the EU and NATO. Georgian Armed Forces were modernized, trained with NATO forces and served in Iraq and Kosovo. Saakashvili did not conceal that the reunification of Georgia was one of the primary goals of his presidency (Nilsson 2009, 91), announcing at the opening of a new highway in 2006 that “In 2008, we will travel to Tskhinvali by this road, and in 2010, or at the beginning of 2011 at the latest, this road will take us to Sukhumi, although I expect to arrive in Sukhumi much earlier than that” (quoted in Cheterian 2009, 158). In 2006, the Saakashvili administration began to implement its policies toward reunification, as Georgian Army invaded the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, renaming it in ‘Upper Abkhazia’ and establishing Abkhazian government in exile, controlled by Tbilisi (Cheterian 2009, 158-59).
At the same time, the coming of Vladimir Putin in the power in Russia signalized the beginning of a new era, when Russia ended the war in Chechnya, attempted to and enhance its influence at the neighbor countries, Georgia amongst them. South Ossetia and the actions of its leadership was orchestrated from the Kremlin, and the relationship with Abkhazia became closer (Cheterian 2009, 158), as the launch of war games on the Abkhazian territory in July of 2008 have confirmed (Malek 2009, 229). Meanwhile, the relations of Russia and Georgia worsened, following the spy scandal in 2006 and mass deportations of Georgian migrants from Russia (Illarionov 2009, 61-62). The peaceful negotiation process between Georgia and separatist regions with the active participation of Russia, in the official role of sole ‘peacekeeper’ was not resultative and effective (Cheterian 2009, 162; Gordadze 2009, 34). Saakashvili claimed that the reason of failed negotiations was that Russia was not a mediator but ‘a party in the conflict’ (quoted in Smith 2009, 132).
Conflict
The question regarding the initiator of the August war in 2008 remains controversial. Some experts (Malek, 2009; Illarionov 2009; Popjanevski 2009) blame Russian Federation others suggest that Georgia and its leader Mikhail Saakashvili are responsible for the escalation of the conflict that led to the war. Malek (2009) argues that Russia started the August war with Georgia and presents evidence that the escalation was planned by Moscow and was preceded by preparations for military actions. As was mentioned above, the consequence of the five-day war was recognition of separatist regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as independent sovereign nation-states, announced by President Dmitri Medvedev on August 26 (Malek 2009, 231). The process of formation of public opinion on this issue and its inclusion in the agenda of the Russian parliament happened several months before the actual escalation. One of the signs of the preparation for armed confrontation was the fact that the number of Russian troops, so called “CIS peacekeepers” in Abkhazia increased without any previous consultation or consent of Georgian side. In addition, from mid-July till August 2, 2008, the Russian Army conducted military exercise “Kavkaz-2008” (Malek 2009, 229). These war games coincided with US-Georgian joint military exercise “Immediate Response-2008 that took part in Georgia, at Vaziani air base (Cheterian 2009, 164). After play-war in Abkhazia ended, attacks against Georgian villages took place in South Ossetia (Malek 2009, 230). At the same time, in the beginning of August, several clashes between Ossetian and Georgian militaries took place, resulting in victims on both sides (Cheterian 2009, 159). In the response to these attacks, Georgian troops invaded South Ossetia on August, 8 in order to “restore constitutional order” (quoted in Cheterian 2009, 159). Malek provides evidence from Russian newspapers that confirms the presence of Russian Armed Forces in South Ossetia prior to Georgian invasion (2009, 230). President Saakashvili also stated that Georgia reacted to the movement of Russian tanks into Georgian territory (Cheterian 2009, 161). However, OSCE military observers, based in South Ossetia confirmed that the build-up of Georgian troops began on August, 7, in the early afternoon. Eric S. Edelman, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, also claimed that Georgian troops launched an attack on August, 7 (Cheterian 2009, 161). Moscow reacted to the Georgian offence in the South Ossetia by moving huge forces as to South Ossetia, so to Abkhazia, which was not an arena of military conflict (Malek 2009, 231). Naturally, large Russian forces easily defeated Georgian Army, pushing them out of South Ossetia, bombed military targets in Georgian territory and took several towns (Cheterian 2009, 159-160). The war ended on August 12, 2008, when thanks to European leaders, particularly, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Moscow and Tbilisi reached a ceasefire agreement.
Analysis
As the case analyzed in this paper is relatively modern, many details of its development remain unclear. For instance, there is a certain ambiguity when the initiator of the crisis is considered, as was discussed above. The available evidence provides arguments for both sides of the conflict. However, the evidence that proves that the initiator of the conflict was Russia is not very convincing. It may be argued that the objective of Putin’s foreign policy was a strengthening of Russian positions in the Caucasus and demonstration of its power and interests to the West and the United States in particular. However, the events that preceded the crisis can be characterized as bait that skillfully decoyed Georgian leadership into a trap of war. Nevertheless, in this paper, Georgia will be regarded as the initiator of the crisis. The motivation and perceptions of Georgian leadership considering its adversary, themselves and international actors will be discussed in the terms of Lebow’s crisis management theory (1984), as well as the theory of misperceptions by Robert Jervis (1988).
The August War between Georgia and Russia is a clear example of a brinkmanship crisis, which resulted in a military conflict. As Lebow (1984) suggested this kind of crisis develops in the case, when one state “knowingly challenges an important commitment of another state in the hope of compelling its adversary to back away from his commitment” (57). In the case of five-day war of 2008, Georgia challenged the commitment of Russia as a ‘peacekeeper’ and its close relationship with and interests in separatist regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian leadership believed that Russia would not directly and openly intervene in the military conflict. As Georgian Defense Minister stated, “We expected that the Russians would fight with the hands of the separatists” (quoted in Cheterian 2009, 162). Thus, the first condition of brinkmanship crisis (Lebow 1984, 61) is satisfied: Georgian policymakers expected that Russia would back away and would not overtly participate in the conflict between Georgia and its separatist region – South Ossetia. Interestingly, the reasoning of the Georgian leadership resembles that of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. First, he anticipated that Russians – “although friends of Serbia” will not intervene in the conflict of Austria and Serbia, and encouraged the initiation of the confrontation; in one month, he claimed that “We have not willed war, it has been forced upon us” (quoted in Lebow 1984, 101). Georgian decision-makers followed the same path: first, initiating a conflict with the territory that was especially important for Russia, as it was repeatedly used as leverage in the relations with Georgia; second, they denied their responsibility for the crisis and war, accusing Russia in the escalation of the situation in the region.
The second condition that states that the initiation of brinkmanship crisis is related to domestic or international threats and problems, which are anticipated to be resolved thanks to “a successful challenge of an adversary’s commitment” (Lebow 1984, 61). Here, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili no longer enjoyed the level of public support that he had after the Rose Revolution. In November, 2007, during 5 days, the opposition powers gathered their supporters, who were dissatisfied by domestic policies of the Saakashvili administration. People rallied, demanding the resignation of the Georgian president and, on November, 7 were shooed away by police. In the same evening, the police forces entered the opposition TV station ‘Imedi’ and shut it down. As a result of these protests, Saakashvili announced snap presidential elections and won, gaining only 53% of votes (Nilsson 2009, 97). Thus, the domestic situation was not very favorable to the Georgian leader – the situation that may have been retrieved by the successful reunification of Georgia. According to Lebow (1984) domestic instability and weakness of political system can motivate policy-makers to launch brinkmanship crisis (66). Another motivation to provoke a war is “the political vulnerability of a leader” (Lebow 1984, 69), who can initiate a confrontation in order to strengthen his position in power (in the case of success). Indeed, “a short victorious war” would have been beneficial to the Saakashvili administration and reduce tension at home. The success in the conflict would have helped Saakashvili to regain the public support and high personal ratings. On the basis of the analysis of the events that preceded the August war, it can be argued that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili wanted to achieve political goals and regain lost public support by using force against the separatist regions and bringing them back under the control of Georgian government. Have he achieved his objectives without the direct confrontation with powerful neighbor, his brinkmanship policy would have been successful. However, the actions of Georgian military have provoked a conflict with the power that surpassed it in any possible aspect: territory, population, economy, influence, and, the most important in the confrontation, in military power. According to Jervis (1976), in order to explain the decisions that leaders make we need to study their “beliefs about the world and their images of others” (28). The August war has become possible mainly because of misperceptions that Georgian leadership had about their own powers, the behavior of an adversary, and the reaction of international actors, primarily, the United States to the military actions of Georgia. Therefore, the misperceptions have aroused at two levels: situational – as the analysis of political context and international arena were misjudged; and perspective level that “concerns policy-makers’ images of themselves, their country, and the world (Lebow 1984, 153).
First, it can be argued that the Georgian leadership was overestimating its own military power. The reason for such optimism was the fact that Georgian troops had been significantly upgraded since the Rose Revolution with the help of American instructors and modern military equipment. Georgian Armed forces participated in NATO missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, gaining experience and moving toward NATO standards – one of the main conditions for the membership in the Alliance. According to Blainey, such optimism can lead to the initiation of war (cited in Jervis 1988, 676). As previous attempts to resolve the territorial conflict with the means of diplomacy and negotiation have failed, thus, leaving the use of force as the only option. Georgia anticipated a short successful war, thus, confirming the assumption of Jervis (1988, 676) that military optimism paired with the pessimistic attitude towards the possibility of diplomatic settlement, is likely to cause an armed conflict. The war without misperceptions is unlikely, argues Jervis, as one side always loses, therefore, “the defeated state made serious miscalculations when it decided to fight” (1988, 677).
The misperception of the aggressiveness of an adversary and its possible reaction, behavior in the face of crisis, can result in war (Jervis 1988, 686). In the case of the war between Georgia and Russia, Georgian policy-makers clearly underestimated the readiness of Russia to interfere in the conflict on its border and, using its military preponderance, seize the control and strengthen its position in the Caucasus region.
The misinterpretation of the situational context by Georgian leadership resulted in the overvalued expectations that in the case of the conflict with Russia, the United States would intervene and defend its strategic partner in the Caucasus region. The Saakashvili administration had reasons to anticipate the overt assistance from the West (or so they thought) because of the signals that Georgia and its leader were receiving from the Bush administration. A month before the August war, Condoleezza Rice, then US Secretary of State, visited Georgia. This visit was interpreted as an open support of the United States leadership for Georgia’s membership in NATO, even though Rice warned Georgian president avoid provoking Russia (Cheterian 2009, 164). This visit and joint military exercise at Vaziani military base convinced Georgia that the USA would support it in the conflict with Russian power, and its failure to openly support Georgia was perceived as a betrayal by the Georgian leadership and the public alike. The wishful thinking of Saakashvili was not discouraged by international observers, who were convinced that the invasion of Georgian troops in the separatist regions would result in a war with Russia (Antonenko 2008, cited in Cheterian 2009, 164). Therefore, the Georgian leader was unwilling to learn from the crisis, was unable to see the cues that pointed out that the aggressive behavior of Russia prior to August, 7, was unlikely to change to the indifference toward the military moves of Georgian troops. The decisions of Saakashvili in the August war demonstrate the validity of Lebow’s findings that, first, expectations about an adversary’s behavior are the basis for the decision-making process of the initiator of the conflict; second, the causes of the unrealistic assessment of an adversary are the same reasons that prevent policy-makers to learn from the crisis; third, domestic problems serve as a motivation to launch a brinkmanship crisis; last, when leaders think that the achievement of particular goals in foreign policy is necessary, they begin to view these goals as achievable (1984, 272).
Conclusion
The case of the August war between Georgia and Russia presents a valuable example of brinkmanship crisis and illustrates the widely spread misconceptions that can encourage decision-makers in the charge of the state to initiate a crisis, begin a war. The reasons of brinkmanship crisis are various. In the case of five-day war, domestic problems motivated Saakashvili to begin the war; this decision was justified by erroneous evaluation of the international context, of the adversary – Russia and its readiness to respond to the Georgian offense on South Ossetia; and misperception of the powers, resources and capability of Georgian Armed Forces to fight this was successfully. The theories of Jervis and Lebow have provided a valuable theoretical framework for the analysis of this case.
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