Abstract
In the case of United States v. Knight, the Supreme Court had to resolve the constitutional question of whether a warrantless search, executed on the basis of a reasonable suspicion and stipulated as a condition of probation violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In order to answer this question, the Court had to determine whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the constitutionality of searches authorized as a condition of probation must have a “probationary purpose.” Ultimately, the Court held that a warrantless search, sustained on the basis of reasonable suspicion and authorized as condition of a probationer’s release was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Critical to the Courts analysis was the belief that probationers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy due to their status, and thus law enforcement, supported by a reasonable suspicion can justifiably target probationers in a way that would be unconstitutional in the context of ordinary citizens, whose expectations of privacy exceed that of probationers.
Keywords: Fourth Amendment, Warrants, Probable Cause
Issue
In the case of United States v. Knight, the Supreme Court had to resolve the constitutional question of whether a warrantless search, executed on the basis of a reasonable suspicion and stipulated as a condition of probation violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In order to answer this question, the Court had to determine whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the constitutionality of searches authorized as a condition of probation must have a “probationary purpose.”
The relevant background in the current case can be summarized as follows: As a condition of probation, Knights consented to unrestricted searches, at any time, but any member of law enforcement, inclusive of probation officers. Shortly thereafter, acting on a reasonable suspicion that Knights was a high priority suspect in an ongoing arson investigation, an unannounced search was performed at Knights residence. The search produced several incriminating items that violated the terms of his probation. After receiving indictment from Federal Grand Jury, Knights attorney’s successfully prevailed on a motion to suppress the incriminating evidence on the grounds that the recovered items were inadmissible because they were recovered pursuant to a search that was not for a “probationary purpose,” and thus, ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. In support of its decision, the District Court drew distinctions between searches that were investigatory in nature and those consistent with a probationary purpose. Knights search was deemed unconstitutional because it was of an investigatory nature. On appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed the verdict of the District Court.
Rule
Reasonableness is the benchmark for determining the constitutionality of searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Determining the reasonable of a search involves a “totality of the circumstances” test, as articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Robinette (1996). The “totality of the circumstances” approach involves a balancing of two factors: the degree to which a search contravenes an individual’s fundamental right to privacy, on the one hand, and, on the other, considerations of the extent to which the execution of a search furthers a legitimate government interest. In these circumstances, it is irrelevant whether an individual consents to a search so long as it is supported by a reasonable suspicion.
With respect to searches on individuals on probation, the reasonableness analysis need only be supported by an individualized suspicion of more probable than not criminality (United States v. Cortez, 1981). Simply put, in assessing the strength of the individualized suspicion, law enforcement is only required to establish a high probability of criminality to prove that that the intrusion on the probationer’s privacy was reasonable. Typically, the standard for reasonableness under long-standing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is established through the “probable cause” standard. However, with respect to searches on probationers, the standard is lower so long as the balance of considerations warrant application of this lower standard (Terry v. Ohio, 1968; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 1973). In brief, the lesser standard is warranted in circumstances where an officer’s reasonable suspicion around probable criminality justifies intruding on a probationer’s privacy.
Analysis
Knights probationary status, as well as the fact that he consented to warrantless searches as a condition of probation is essential to both sides of the balancing of interests required under the “totality of circumstances” test. For instance, the majority opinion stipulates that, consistent with the Courts ruling in Morrisey v. Brewer (1972), individuals under correctional supervision (e.g. parole or probation) do not enjoy the same liberty interests as law-abiding citizens (119). Consistent with this analysis, as a condition of granting probation, courts have broad authority to attach reasonable conditions on release. Here, a judge determined that as a condition of probation, Knight would need to acquiesce to warrantless searches, irrespective of whether they had a probationary purpose. And so, the majority concludes that the search condition of Knights probation was reasonable in that it furthered two legitimate goals of probation: rehabilitation and promoted public safety by surveilling individuals likely to reoffend but for rehabilitation. What’s more, the terms of probation were expressed clearly prior to Knight’s relief. In brief, owing to the terms of Knight’s probation, the court finds that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.
With respect to government interest aspect of the “totality of circumstances” balance, the majority draws on its analysis in Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987). In Griffin, the Court acknowledged the premise that individuals under correctional supervision are more likely than others to engage in lawlessness (880). Citing statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice, the Court was persuaded by the fact the recidivism rate for probationers is decidedly higher than the overall crime rate. What’s more, the fact that probationers have an incentive to conceal lawlessness owing to the penalties for violating the terms of probation means that law enforcement has a compelling interest to effect warrantless searches (Knights, 120). Accordingly, the Court describes two overriding concerns relative to probationers. First, there is the legitimate worry that reintegration into society is unlikely prior to successful completion of the terms of release. Secondly, the concern around the higher probability of reoffending is supported by a mounting body of reliable crime statistics. For this reason, it is unnecessary to determine if the search at Knight’s home was investigatory or probationary in nature, or if he consented to the search as a condition of probation.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Court held that the warrantless search of Knights, based on reasonable suspicion and consistent with the terms of Knights probation, fell within the reasonableness standard for searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Whereas the Court of Appeals decided that that the government could not target probationers in a way that ran afoul of the way it searched ordinary citizens, the Supreme Court disagreed. Critical to the Courts decision was that the idea that because probationers are more likely not only to reoffend, but also to conceal such conduct, it was justifiable to target them in way that would violate the Fourth Amendment in the context of an ordinary citizen subject to an unreasonable, warrantless search. In line with this reasoning, the Court conceded that the very nature of probation implies that an individual can expect curtailment of some privacy rights. In line with the long standing precedent of holding that the balancing of considerations only entail determinations of whether there was reasonable suspicion to effect a warrantless search on a probationer’s property, an affirmative determination is all that is required to establish the “totality of circumstances” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Another important aspect of the Courts analysis is the implications of not reversing the Court of Appeals decision to put limits on the types of searches that meet the reasonableness test. The Court of Appeals decision did not consider the statistics on recidivism in reaching it decision. In fact, the Court of Appeals determined that with respect to searches authorized in connection with a probation condition, the search violated the Fourth Amendment unless it had a “probationary purpose” In rejecting this argument, the majority opinion points out that the Fourth Amendment doesn’t draw distinctions between searches that are investigatory and those that have a probationary purpose.
References
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868. (1987) United States Supreme Court. Legal Information
Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 11 March. 2016.
Ohio v. Ribonette, 534 U.S. 112 (1996). United States Supreme Court. Legal Information
Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 11 March. 2016.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States Supreme Court. Legal Information
Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 11 March. 2016.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). United States Supreme Court. Legal Information
Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 11 March. 2016.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 441 (1981). United States Supreme Court. Legal Information
Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 11 March. 2016.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). United States Supreme Court. Legal
Information Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 11 March. 2016.
