A Case Law Brief
391 U.S. 510 (1968)
I. Facts
On April 29, 1959, a police patrol car that has stopped for a red light was approached by a woman. The woman complained to the officers that the petitioner, Witherspoon, had assaulted her outside of a nearby tavern. The woman also informed the officers that Witherspoon was armed. Witherspoon, who had observed the woman talking to the police, ran into an adjacent parking lot and hid in a parked truck. Following up on the woman’s complaint, the police pursued Witherspoon into the parking lot. When one of the officers happened unto Witherspoon hiding in a truck, Witherspoon shot him. Before dying, the injured officer positively identified Witherspoon as the shooter. Witherspoon was eventually captured and brought to trial for murder.
Prior to the start of the trial, during jury selection, the state and defense were given the opportunity to strike or excuse from participation, those jurors they considered biased against their view of what occurred that April night. Under Illinois law, the state could strike any juror who had either a “general opposition” or “conscientious scruples against” the death penalty. Based on that Illinois statute, the state was able to strike nearly half of the jury pool from participating in the jury. At trial, the eventual jury found Witherspoon guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. While on death row, Witherspoon appealed his conviction, arguing that the process by which the jury was selected violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of the law.
II. Procedural History
The trial was heard in 1960 in Cook County Superior Court. After being convicted , Witherspoon appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court arguing a number of errors were committed at trial that were unconstitutional prejudicial to his case. In 1963, the Illinois Supreme Court denied his appeal. Witherspoon then filed an appeal in the Federal Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit arguing that the Illinois State courts had erred in denying relief for his appeal and refusing to give him a new trial. In 1964, the Seventh Circuit also denied his appeal. In 1965, Witherspoon filed another appeal with the Illinois State Supreme Court “requesting whatever form of remedy is ‘provided for by Illinois law’” and the claim that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated based on the exclusion of prospective jurors because of the beliefs about capital punishment. The Illinois State Supreme Court again denied his appeal arguing that it the system of jury selection, which allows both sides the opportunity to strike jurors, was impartial. Finally, Witherspoon petitioned the United States Supreme Court focusing on his constitutional argument and the Court agreed to hear the case. Oral arguments were held on April 1968 and the decision of the Court was delivered in June 1968.
III. Issue(s)
Does the Constitution permit a jury to sentence a person to death where potential jurors were excluded simply for having conscientious scruples against or a general objection to the death penalty?
IV. Rule(s)
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a constitutional right for an impartial jury drawn from a group that represents a cross-section of the community including people with varying degrees of intelligence, social and economic backgrounds and beliefs. While a juror who displays clear and unchangeable bias against the death penalty may be excused from a trial where they will be imposing punishment; striking a juror simply because they have a general objection to or conscientious scruples against capital punishment without determining the degree of opposition is illegal
V. Analysis
In petitioning the Court to hear his appeal, Witherspoon argued that the exclusion of potential jurors because of their mere “opposition” to the death penalty resulted in a jury that was biased for the prosecution and in finding that he was guilty. In support of his argument, Witherspoon submitted what he claimed was “scientific evidence” showing that people who support the death penalty are more likely to find defendant’s guilty as charged. Under the Court’s analysis, the evidence submitted by Witherspoon was unpersuasive. Moreover, research that the Court performed on its own also found no evidence that proved his claim that a jury composed of people who support of the death penalty would be impartially biased towards convicting him. Consequently, the Court rejected his argument as he stated it.
Witherspoon’s trial, however, was not an average trial. The jury was not only responsible for determining his innocence or guilt; but was also charged with determining, upon conviction, what punishment should be imposed. For the Court, the jury’s composition played a fundamental role in imposing the death penalty, and due to that special circumstance; the Court was able to apply Witherspoon’s argument to the penalty phase of the trial. Indeed, according to the Court because the jury was made “the arbiter of punishment of the convicted,” having a jury composed of people who all supported the death penalty was fundamentally biased towards imposing death in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In making its decision, the Court dismissed the state’s argument that people who opposed the death penalty can’t be relied on to impose it even when the law or circumstances deem it appropriate. Under the Court’s analysis, the majority of the public either opposed or had reservations about the use of the death penalty. Therefore it was naturally that this view of the community be taken into account when deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed. However, in Witherspoon’s case, the community’s view was eliminated and replaced by a group of people who “can only speak for a minority” view of the citizens. In terms of sentencing, it was a jury not drawn for the cross-section of the people. As a result, in regards to punishment, Witherspoon was faced with a biased, unfair and impartial jury in violation of the Constitution. As the Court saw it, if the Constitution forbids the empanelment of a jury that would unquestioningly convict a defendant, it must follow that it also forbids a jury that would automatically “hang” a defendant found guilty.
The Court also found that the juror selection procedure of excluding potential jurors that are unconditionally biased against the death penalty was legal. As the Court saw it, someone who was diametrically opposed to the death penalty could not be impartial even when the situation called for it. The problem with the Witherspoon trial, according to the Court however, was that the state exclude the majority of objectors without confirming whether despite their objections they could still trusted to act impartially. To be sure, under the Court’s count, only five of the 47 potential jurors that were dismissed explicitly stated that under no circumstances would they impose the death penalty. The remaining 42 potential jurors were dismissed only after admitting that they had a general opposition or conscientious scruples against the death penalty. For the Court, the casual manner that the state excluded the witnesses suggested that they looking to sit a jury that was partial in favor of imposing the death penalty.
VI. Conclusion
In a 6-3 decision, the Court found in favor of Witherspoon and overturned his death penalty sentence. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that while he agreed with the decision of the majority, he would have went further and allowed even those juror’s that are unconditionally opposed to the death penalty to sit on the jury. As Justice Douglas perceived it, they are part of the community of citizens the Constitution demands be part of a jury. Excluding them incorrectly leaves a jury of pro-death penalty advocates, and death penalty neutrals. There were also two dissenting opinions by Justices Black and White. Justice Black felt that the impartiality that the Constitution demands covers both the defendant and the state. Accordingly, since it’s likely that people who opposed the death penalty also oppose the prosecutor; keeping them on a jury would create illegal anti-state bias in favor of the defendant. Justice White’s dissent focused on the role of the legislature in passing criminal laws. According to Justice White if a legislature could impose a particular penalty against a particular class of convict, then they should also be allowed to delegate that authority to a group that would impose the death penalty more often than another group would. As Justice White saw it, the legislature could “veto” the Court’s opinion by allowing juries in the penalty phase of a trial to have a majority verdict rather than a unanimous verdict.
