Wittgenstein believed that flaws in philosophical reasoning would be exposed by understanding the hidden flaws in language. To that end he wrote extensively on the topic of understanding linguistics in order to clarify the language flaws. He asserted that while good for day to day conversation, but unsuitable for defining complex philosophical arguments. This is in part because when people are talking the subject is taken in context and defined by the parameters of the conversation. However, philosophical matters are taken beyond everyday experience and need more specific terms in order to be discussed and understood. The words knowing and knowledge themselves are an example of this, when someone says “I know” in a conversation it is generally clear what they are speaking of. Nevertheless, if a philosopher were to ask the same person to define “knowledge” they would be stymied.
Wittgenstein believed that what we consider to be philosophical problems were really just philosophical confusion. As a result the correct way to solve philosophical problems was not to attempt to ‘solve’ them at all, it was to refine them to the point that the simply dissolve. When he referred to the differences between his work and that of other philosophers he saw his theories as activities rather than knowledge. What he attempted to do was to clarify the existing body of philosophical wisdom through a series of exercises or thought play, and change the role of philosophy to one of activity. At the very least, he wanted to active clarification to the functions of philosophers.
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein challenges the reader using the example of the word ‘game’ to establish that there is no definition of that word that encompasses everything we call a game and, at the same time exclude everything we do not call a game. He then expands upon this to involve other words. By doing this he tries to make it clear that the way a word is used determines its meaning. Word definitions then do not establish the meaning of a word, instead they show the different ways that a word can be used. Later on in his argument he uses this as a foundation for the concept that because there is no fixed meaning of a word, there can be no fixed meaning for the concept that the word represents.
Part of how Wittgenstein challenges us to think is on grammar and terms like "to fit", "to be able", and "to understand". In the course of this he involves the use of mental images and activities. Envisioning a cube is one basic premise, and one that should be simple. Wittgenstein takes that concept and shows all the complexities involved. Reading is used as another one of the examples since it can involve spelling out words letter by letter, or skimming. After discussing that concept he goes further and discusses understanding using a series of numbers. As the terms, get more complex the activities of using and defining them do as well. In this process, he makes the point that if we cannot define and simplify a discussion of reading, it is unlikely that we will have any more success with complex cases such as understanding.
In this way, using Wittgenstein’s reasoning a cylinder C can be said to fit into a hollow cylinder H only while C is stuck into H. We can sometimes say that C ceased to fit into H at such-and-such a time. However, that employs the criteria that it cannot be proven that C still fits into H unless C is in H. Once removed from H, the possibility exists that C will no longer fit into H. The change of mental position reflects the changed physical positions of the cylinders. To use this in an analysis we would first have to define the word ‘fit.’ If we think of our legs as approximately cylindrical and a pair of pants as being cylinders as well we could say our legs fit inside a pair of pants no matter how loose or tight they may be. However, we would not think of the pants as ‘fitting’ they were so tight that we risked a wardrobe malfunction by the pants either splitting or falling off with each step. If we think of more classic cylinder shapes, such as tubes, a paper tube we call cylinder C could fit inside another, called cylinder H in width, but not in length, in that case it would not totally be covered by cylinder H and so may not be able to be understood as fitting inside. Conversely, cylinder C might fit in terms of in length but require folding in order to fit its width, in that case it might no longer be a cylinder but assume another shape while inside. In that instance even though it fits inside it is not able to do so as a cylinder and so would no longer be able to be understood in the context of the sentence cylinder C fits inside hollow cylinder H.
In a different scenario, cylinder C might be a rolled paper that expands inside hollow cylinder H to fill it without losing its cylindrical shape and without protruding from either end. In that instance, those two objects fit the criteria of the statement, cylinder C fits inside hollow cylinder H. An example of this is when you roll up a poster to mail it or store it in a paper tube. However, if you unroll the poster when you remove it, the poster would then assume the aspect of a flat piece of paper and would no longer be able to fit our understanding that cylinder C fits inside hollow cylinder H because cylinder C would no longer be a cylinder. To take this situation further it is possible that the poster we call cylinder C remains rolled up enough to still be called a cylinder, but expands enough to no longer fit inside cylinder H without being re-rolled. In that case again those two objects would no longer fit the our understanding of the statement, cylinder C fits inside hollow cylinder H, because although it is still a cylinder the diameter changed and so is not able to be inserted in cylinder H.
We accept criteria for 'fitting', 'being able to', understanding', and do not initially realize the implication of their various meanings and the concepts behind them. These are more complicated than they might initially appear. Wittgenstein’s word game with these words, and their usage as usually is carried out is more involved than we usually think
This is why Wittgenstein requires us to learn to understand these layers of complexity in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. Since definitions usually fail to resolve them; so does the assertion that a word is 'indefinable'. This ‘game’ illustrates the point that if it can be so difficult to define a sentence such as cylinder C fits inside hollow cylinder H when we are illustrating it using the situation of putting a poster inside a paper tube, then it is even more difficult, and more important to attempt to resolve and clarify terms when attempting to reach an understanding of philosophical paradoxes.
Bibliography
Internet Archive . "Audio Collection - Wittgenstein - m3u." 2012. Internet Archive. 17 12 2012
Richter, Duncan J. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951)." 30 08 2004. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 17 12 2012
Sacks, Jonathan. "Ludwig Wittgenstein." 2012. BBC Radio. 17 12 2012
Shawer, Lois. "Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations." 2012. Wittgenstein. 17 12 2012
